


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25 AUGUST 1992



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# ***JPRS Report***

## **East Europe**

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# East Europe

JPRS-EER-92-115

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**Statute of Union of Democratic Forces Published**  
*92BA1086A Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 12*  
*Jun 92 p 6*

[Report by Van'o Lazarov, a member of the National Coordinating Council of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) and chairman of the SDS Commission on Amending and Supplementing the SDS Statute: "Statute of the Union of Democratic Forces"]

[Text]

**I. Structures**

**Article 1.** The Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] is a national movement of parties, organizations, and private citizens, whose organizational nature has been contractually structured as a political coalition.

The SDS has the following structures:

- Township coordinating councils.
- Local coordinating councils.
- Regional coordinating councils.
- National Coordinating Council [NKS].
- National Conference.

**II. Members**

**Article 2.** Parties and organizations may be accepted as members of the SDS by the NKS by a two-thirds majority of the full members of the SDS.

**Article 3.** A candidate member must submit to the NKS a petition, a statute, a program declaration, a constituent protocol signed by all charter members with their full names and addresses, a list of the organizations in the country and their leaderships, and the figures on its approximate membership.

**Article 4.** The Commission on Union Ethics will check the accuracy of the documents as per Article 3 and, within 10 days of their submission by the chairman of the organization, submit its report to the NKS.

**Article 5.** The acceptance vote, as per Article 2, must take place not earlier than one month and not later than two months after the submission of the report as per Article 4. Prior to the vote, the Commission on Union Ethics must issue a ruling on the consistency between the political practices of the applying organization and the program documents and the objectives and tasks of the SDS.

**Article 6.** Members of the SDS who violate the constituent declaration or the political agreements concluded by the union or systematically violate their own statutory and program documents may be subject to expulsion from the SDS. The decision to expel must be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the remaining full members of the SDS, after presentation of a report by the Commission on Union Ethics. In unclear cases, the NKS, with the same majority, may "freeze" membership for a period not exceeding two months, during which the organization in question will have the status of observer (in all coordinating councils).

**III. Township Coordinating Councils (ObKS's)**

**Article 7.** A township coordinating council consists of representatives of the parties and organizations that are full members of the SDS and have township groups consisting of no fewer than 10 registered members.

**Article 8.** Each party or organization is represented in an ObKS by two members.

**Article 9.** Paragraph 1. Representatives of each organization in an ObKS are based on its township structure. The organization submits to the ObKS a list of representatives consisting of three or four persons, the first two of whom are titular members, while the others are reserve members. The chairman of the respective organization is the one heading the list.

The representatives are named at the general assembly of the respective township organization. The fact is certified with a protocol signed by all present members or by any other means stipulated in the bylaws. The protocols of general meetings and other documents certifying to representation in an ObKS must be certified with the seal and signature of the central leadership of the respective party or organization. The signature must be that of the individual who, in accordance with the statute and the laws of the country, has the right to represent the organization. With this certification, the central leaderships guarantee the legitimacy of the election of representatives to the ObKS and assume responsibility as per Article 6.

Paragraph 2. The newly established township units of parties and organizations that are full members of the SDS acquire voting rights in the township coordinating council eight weeks after the submission of documents for membership.

Paragraph 3. Spouses or blood relatives, such as brothers or sisters, may not represent different parties or organizations in the township coordinating council.

Paragraph 4. Members of the township coordinating council may not be members of any party or organization other than the one they represent.

**Article 10.** Copies of the documents certifying to the right to be a representative in an ObKS and the legitimacy of the township leaderships and the parties and organizations, stamped with the original seals and signed, are filed with the ObKS secretary and the National Coordinating Department of the SDS. Data contained in the documents concerning the structure of an ObKS and the township leaderships of the groups are entered in a special register by the National Coordinating Department and certified with the signature of the department head.

**Article 11.** Groups that have failed to issue authorizations to their representatives as per the stipulations mentioned above may not participate in the work of an ObKS and may not nominate candidates for elective positions within the township.

**Article 12.** An ObKS elects a chairman, a deputy chairmen, and a secretary from among its members. The chairman is

not part of the quota of the respective organization, and his seat is filled by the next representative in the submitted list of representatives.

**Article 13.** Voting rights in the ObKS of the SDS are granted exclusively to organizations that have been granted the same right by the NKS of the SDS and have no fewer than 10 members. The ballot may be cast by the member who heads the list of representatives. The next member on the list may demand that his opinion be made part of the minutes. The chairman of the township coordinating council does not vote.

**Article 14.** No township may have more than one ObKS.

#### IV. Local Coordinating Councils (MKS's)

**Article 15.** Local coordinating councils are set up on the territory of settlements.

**Article 16.** MKS's are formed on the basis of representatives of the respective local organizations authenticated by the township leaderships of the groups and documents kept by the KS [coordinating council] secretaries. The certified copies or summaries of such documents are sent to the ObKS and the National Coordinating Department.

**Article 17.** No settlement may have more than one MKS.

#### V. Regional Coordinating Councils (RKS's)

**Article 18.** Regional coordinating councils are established in regions as defined by the NKS of the SDS.

**Article 19.** Regional coordinating councils are established by proposals submitted by the parties and organizations that are members of the SDS and by the ObKS on the territory of the area, together with the Commission on Union Ethics; they are ratified by the NKS of the SDS.

**Article 20.** No region, as defined in Article 18, may have more than one RKS.

#### VI. SDS-Sympathizer Clubs

**Article 21.** Paragraph 1. Clubs of SDS sympathizers are free formations of supporters of the SDS who assist the SDS township and local coordinating councils in their activities.

Individuals who profess fascism, communism, racism, terrorism, or violence of any kind, or those whose views contradict the goals and ideals of the SDS may not participate in the clubs of SDS sympathizers.

Paragraph 2. The clubs of SDS sympathizers may not include members of parties or political organizations.

**Article 22.** The SDS sympathizer clubs in the territories of local or township coordinating councils elect their leaderships and are represented in these coordinating councils with the right to a consultative vote.

#### VII. Rights of Coordinating Councils

**Article 23.** Coordinating councils make political and organizational decisions relating to the implementation of the objectives and tasks of the SDS exclusively for the territory they represent.

**Article 24.** The coordinating councils may submit proposals to the superior coordinating council on solving political and organizational problems relating to the implementation of the objectives and tasks of the SDS or those exceeding the limits of their authority as per Article 23.

**Article 25.** In implementing its activities as per Article 23, no coordinating council may be restricted by a superior council except in the following cases:

- If the matter is not exclusively of local significance for the territory represented by the respective coordinating council.
- If the decision that was passed conflicts with the program documents and strategy of the SDS.
- If the decision violates the established legal order or is immoral or clearly compromises the name of the SDS.

A restricting resolution must be passed by a two-thirds majority of the members. In the case of a dispute, the matter is resolved by the Commission on Union Ethics of the NKS.

#### VIII. Functioning of Coordinating Councils

**Article 26.** The meetings of the coordinating councils are based on an approved agenda and must be held at least once every week. Extraordinary meetings may be convened by the chairman or the deputy chairman, or at the request of one-third of the organization members or by other individuals authorized by the NKS.

**Article 27.** Meetings are held if all organizations have been properly informed and if two-thirds of the organizational members are present.

**Article 28.** Decisions are passed by a simple majority of the organizational members unless otherwise stipulated in this statute.

**Article 29.** The minutes of each session must be kept. The minutes must be signed by all organizations. In the case of a diverging opinion, those who have expressed it must sign the minutes with the separate opinion.

**Article 30.** The minutes are kept by the KS secretary. The right to access to the minutes is granted to all members of the leaderships of the represented organizations, KS members, members of all superior KS's, and individuals specifically authorized by the NKS.

**Article 31.** The coordinating councils draft the rules governing their work in accordance with this statute.

**Article 32.** If no resolution can be adopted because of conflict among the representatives of different parties and organizations in the course of two consecutive sessions of the KS of the SDS, the KS chairman initiates a procedure to replace these individuals by those lower on the list for each of the organizations. He submits a recommendation to the corresponding party group to ask its representatives in the KS to resolve the conflict. If contradictions are not resolved at the following meeting, with the agreement of the Commission on Union Ethics and the party's central leadership,

the KS votes by simple majority to release from its membership such representatives and to replace them with the ones next on the list for each party and organization.

#### IX. Concluding Provisions

**Article 33.** Amendments to this statute may be passed by the NKS by a two-thirds majority of its members, as well as by the National Conference of the SDS by a simple majority of those present.

**Article 34.** Paragraph 1. Political agreements for joint activities with an "ally" status may be concluded with parties and organizations that are not SDS members. Those parties and organizations may attend certain meetings if invited by the NKS of the SDS, and are granted voting rights in resolving particularly important issues. They have no right to nominate candidates for elections on behalf of the SDS.

Paragraph 2. Organizations that are members of the SDS have the right to observer status by decision of the NKS.

#### X. Provisional Clause

**Article 35.** Representatives of township formations of parties and organizations in township coordinating councils who do not meet the conditions of Article 7 of this statute have the right to participate in such councils in an advisory capacity until they have met the conditions of that article.

The final amendments and supplements of this statute were adopted at the Fourth National Conference of the SDS on 12 April 1992.

The draft amendment of the statute, adopted at the Fourth National Conference of the SDS, was consistent with the suggestions submitted by all of the parties and organizations that are members of the SDS, the local and township KS's, individual deputies, and individual sympathizers of our union.

Entirely new drafts of the SDS statute were received from the SDS KS in Varna and the SDS consultative council in Sofia. Subsequently, the Sofia consultative council shortened its proposal: Instead of an entirely new statute, only three more essential amendments to the statute were proposed, different from the one suggested by the SDS Commission on Amendments and Supplements to the Statute.

Following their discussion and classification, the proposals received by the commission, including those based on the statements made at the conference, were reduced essentially to the following:

1. Clarifying the organization and activities of local and township KS's of the SDS.
2. Limiting opportunities for an incorrect or disloyal attitude toward the coalition principle in the political activities of local and township KS's.

3. Introducing new texts in the statute to replace previous ones, with a view to clarifying their meaning—that is, consisting of editorial amendments.

The proposals that were submitted also made clear that there were no direct proposals conflicting in principle with the coalition nature of the SDS.

The commission submitted to the attention of the delegates a new draft of Article 1 of the statute, approved by the SDS and the KS. Its new aspect is that it takes into consideration the basic SDS document: the contractual political agreement among parties and organizations, which legally regulates the existence of the SDS. So far, no objections to this new text have been received by the commission.

Any political document reflects its own time. Differences in the period between the third and the fourth national conferences of the SDS are obvious. The third conference resolved the political issue of the SDS: the creation of the type of organizational structure that could overthrow communism. This task, this objective, and this dream of millions of anticommunists in Bulgaria is now a reality. The communists are now in the opposition.

The fundamental political objective included in the amended statute is embodied in its nature, which unifies diversity within the SDS: It is both a political coalition and a national anticommunist movement.

The right formula was found: to allow sympathizers of the SDS to organize themselves freely and, within the townships, to assist the SDS ObKS's in their activities. The SDS coalition ensures the legitimacy and scope for activities to such civic formations, "committees," or "clubs."

Some of the proposals asked that the city committees be granted ObKS status, identical to that of the parties and organizations. That is not impossible, but the question is what their political responsibility will be and to whom they will be answerable.

The concept that we do not wish to be parts of parties and organizations—that is, for nonpolitical people to make political decisions without being responsible for them to anyone else—is illogical. There can be no rights without obligations and without reciprocal control and responsibility. Although a high percentage of SDS sympathizers, organized in clubs, indeed work impeccably to promote the SDS cause, there are also numerous cases, particularly of late, in which very hastily created clubs include people whose intentions are unclean and who aspire to power by taking the most direct, the easiest, and the unobstructed way.

Once the SDS achieved its electoral objective, the activities of the clubs were legally terminated. The new amendments aim at giving a legitimate nature to the club form of organized SDS sympathizers. Political responsibility for them is assumed by their local SDS ObKS.

As for the insistence on regular voting, it is reasonable to question who needs it if the aspirations are selfless.

Today we are in power in this country! For the first time in nearly half a century, it is not a totalitarian (let us call things by their true names) or a communist-Asiatic type of management. Bulgaria is developing in a normal, civilized way. This is a path leading to the true human possibilities of freedom and individual prosperity, of which the communists deprived us. This path, which is

new and unfamiliar to most of us, is devilishly difficult. Economic dislocation plus fierce opposition on the part of the BSP, the communist mutant, make it even more difficult.

How shall we start, together or with petty quarrels? We are convinced that we shall find within ourselves the strength to protect the blue magic, the cause of the SDS, from our petty human passions.

**Jan Carnogursky Views Postelection Prospects**  
92CH0815A Bratislava KULTURNY ZIVOT in Slovak  
2 Jul 92 p 4

[Interview with former Slovak Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky by Michal Ac and Martin Kasarda; place and date not given: "It Is Possible To Govern With Decency"]

[Text] *Future historians will certainly be able to evaluate the recent period better than could any of the three people who sat down at the same table one day after the last session of the Slovak Republic Government (17 June). What we wanted to do was to ponder what is happening in Slovakia at this time. We leave it to the imagination of the reader to answer the question why we met precisely in this configuration. Because events are happening so fast, we think that, by the time this discussion appears in print, it will be quite obvious.*

[KULTURNY ZIVOT] Mr. Carnogursky, several times recently you expressed concern about the future of Slovakia. What led you to it?

[Carnogursky] I do not see that Slovakia is sufficiently secured if it is to become independent. Slovakia does not have enough powerful friends abroad. Slovakia is not sufficiently united internally and prepared for an independent existence, and obviously even the economy of an independent Slovakia would have to overcome serious difficulties.

[KULTURNY ZIVOT] That means that you are not in favor of breaking up Czecho-Slovakia?

[Carnogursky] I find it difficult to explain my position in a way that would make it sufficiently understandable, and, moreover, do so succinctly. I am a proponent of the national idea, I am convinced that Slovakia has the right to self-determination including independence, and I believe that nations should be pebbles in the mosaic of Europe. I give preference to this way of uniting Europe, that is, basically on the national principle. On the other hand, I can see that for the time being Europe is not integrating predominantly on the national principle but on the state principle, I see that at this time European institutions—above all, the European Community—do not view the idea of admitting independent Slovakia favorably. Moreover, the breakup of Czecho-Slovakia would cause difficulties that I have already mentioned. However, I am convinced that after a sufficiently long time it will be possible to turn around the presently inadequate support for the Slovak efforts in European institutions; Slovak right to self-determination would be realized by gradual inclusion in European institutions without harming the Czech nation, without those problems, about which I spoke, becoming too serious.

[KULTURNY ZIVOT] In your roundtable discussion on TV after the elections you spoke about the danger of a Yugoslav-like development here if Slovakia were to secede. What caused you to make that statement?

[Carnogursky] No such danger threatens in the relations between Slovaks and Czechs. But I am uneasy about some announcements made by the representatives of the HZDS [Movement for Democratic Slovakia] concerning the language law, which if they were to be implemented, could bring the situation in Slovakia to a head.

[KULTURNY ZIVOT] The demand for territorial autonomy, which the Hungarian parties want to press should Slovakia become independent, would certainly contribute to that.

[Carnogursky] Yes, because territorial autonomy is unacceptable for Slovaks who live in southern Slovakia, and therefore also for the Slovak Government.

[KULTURNY ZIVOT] You publicly criticized HZDS and especially its chairman, Mr. Meciar, for lack of political culture. What specifically do you accuse him of in this respect?

[Carnogursky] Much could be said on the subject of Vladimir Meciar's political culture. I will mention three levels. First, there is the language Meciar uses. For example, at a recent press conference he said about some government representatives that they smell to high heaven. The second level is the way he talks about what our partners said during negotiations. Following the negotiations, when the partners are absent, he gives a distorted account of the positions taken by the ODS [Civic Democratic Party]. The third level is the uncompromising way of presenting his demands, which the other side sees as provocation. That is why it is difficult to reach an agreement.

[KULTURNY ZIVOT] What is your definition of proper political culture?

[Carnogursky] Political culture should be based at least on gracious behavior even toward one's opponents. A political struggle can be hard, and often is hard, but one should use truthful arguments. The language should be polite, on the politeness level of the normally spoken language. After the elections, the opponents of the KDH [Christian Democratic Movement] rebuked us for our closing arguments against HZDS and Meciar in the election campaign. In the pamphlet named "Twelve Reasons Why Not To Elect HZDS" we listed the reasons why, in our opinion, HZDS should not be elected. Not one of these reasons can be called false, in fact, what has been happening since the elections more than confirms the truth of those reasons.

[KULTURNY ZIVOT] Do you think that inside HZDS there exist forces which could realistically steer the negotiations with ODS in a different direction?

[Carnogursky] One week after the election victory, which HZDS won mainly thanks to Vladimir Meciar, no other forces in HZDS have a realistic chance. But after some time they could.

[KULTURNY ZIVOT] Do you have some specific people in mind?

[Carnogursky] Yes, but I would not like to name them at this time.

[KULTURNY ZIVOT] We think, for example, of Mr. Filkus as a man who has different views on the state setup as well as on the economic reform.

[Carnogursky] You are right, but Filkus did not have a chance of winning the elections in Slovakia.

[KULTURNY ZIVOT] Why was it precisely Meciar who was so attractive to the voters? Why did Christian Slovakia elect a former Communist?

[Carnogursky] Meciar offered quick, radical, and seemingly simple solutions.

[KULTURNY ZIVOT] And as it turned out, that was enough.

[Carnogursky] In combination with the existing difficulties, yes.

[KULTURNY ZIVOT] What is your conception of a rightist conservative-liberal bloc which could proceed in opposition to the emerging leftist group of the ruling parties, HZDS, the SDL [Slovak Democratic Left], and the Slovak National Party [SNS]?

[Carnogursky] We don't need to hide the fact that among the right-oriented parties and groupings there have been and still are differences, especially ideological ones. When, for instance, I talk to KULTURNY ZIVOT, I know what to expect. And these differences have thus far prevented the formation of a more cohesive rightist bloc, and are still preventing it. On the other hand, the election victory of the leftist bloc forces us to tone down these differences and look for common ground. Overcoming these differences, however, depends, paradoxically, also on the left; the point is, what kind of mistakes will the left make, and how much it may possibly threaten us, and thus force us to overcome the existing problems and unite ourselves against it?

[KULTURNY ZIVOT] Can you imagine what specifically would have to happen in order for the rightist forces to unite? And if they do, would it not be merely a union in the negative sense, that is, against something, or could some common positive values also be found?

[Carnogursky] I shall try a little witticism for a moment, and say that it does not have to take only negative reasons for KULTURNY ZIVOT to overcome some of its positions. But seriously, if as a result of the new government's policy some serious social unrest were to occur, obviously it would lead to a greater cohesion of the opposition. Again, it is very difficult for me to speak about it, because it would be, above all, Slovakia that would suffer as a result of such unrest, and that is what I want least of all.

[KULTURNY ZIVOT] Some zealous "nationalists" accuse you of anti-Slovak politics. For example, in the 17 June issue of KORIDOR Dusan Slobodnik called you a witting traitor to vital Slovak interests. We think that statements by a man who is an ardent candidate for the post of minister in the newly forming Slovak Government should be at the very least somewhat more restrained. What do you think?

[Carnogursky] Literary people have a tendency to express themselves rather eloquently. I do not attach too much importance to it.

[KULTURNY ZIVOT] Don't you think that in the future some actions of a different nature than "only" verbal attacks could be planned against you?

[Carnogursky] I am not afraid of that, because they cannot accuse me of anything. Moreover, I lived through some of that during the communist era, so I have some experience in this respect.

[KULTURNY ZIVOT] Do you expect a normal activity of an opposition in the parliament, then?

[Carnogursky] Yes.

[KULTURNY ZIVOT] How are you prepared for it? What ideas will you be promoting?

[Carnogursky] Every opposition party faces the danger that it will define itself only negatively vis-a-vis the government. That would not be enough. KDH must cement its positive idea of Slovak politics, of Slovak position in the constitutional, geopolitical, economic, cultural areas.... We shall criticize the government on the basis of the differences between its conception and our plan for the future of Slovakia.

[KULTURNY ZIVOT] What is your positive plan for the future of Slovakia?

[Carnogursky] On the international political side, it is the entry by way of Czecho-Slovakia into European integration, on the internal political side, it is a free and tolerant society. If this were not an interview for KULTURNY ZIVOT, I would even say a free, tolerant, and liberal society, but your readers could interpret this word the wrong way.

[KULTURNY ZIVOT] Why? Maybe they would take it as an acknowledgment of the fact that you reevaluated your words about liberalism being dangerous for Slovakia; after all, in our view, if we are to speak today about any danger, it is more likely the threat of a possible return to socialism....

[Carnogursky] It is possible that such a danger at this time and in the short term is greater; however, after the worldwide collapse of communism I still consider liberalism to be the greatest danger.

[KULTURNY ZIVOT] Then, of course, we must ask what you meant by directing Slovakia toward a free, tolerant, and liberal society?

[Carnogursky] Every organized society puts certain limits on the individual in order to maintain itself. For example, the Penal Code contains certain limits on an individual: He does not have the freedom to murder, steal, etc. The difference between, let us say, a Christian democracy and liberalism is approximately through which point on the scale such a limit should be placed. For example, in my opinion the publishing of the story "Maybe Last Evening" in KULTURNY ZIVOT should already have been such a limit. Another difference is which positive values are to be given greater support and with what emphasis.

[KULTURNY ZIVOT] How do you evaluate the brief era of your government? As successful or as less successful?

[Carnogursky] I hope that for the future my government will be proof that it is possible to govern Slovakia also with decency.

### Uhde Comments on Slovak, Czech Constitution

92CH0837D Bratislava TELEGRAF in Slovak  
29 Jul 92 p 3

[Interview with Czech Parliament Chairman Milan Uhde by Gejza Pinter; place and date not given: "A Determined Diplomat"]

[Text] *Upon the conclusion of negotiations between the Czech National Council and the Slovak National Council, we requested an interview with Milan Uhde, chairman of the Czech National Council.*

[Pinter] You are acquainted with the draft of the constitution of the Slovak Republic. What is your impression?

[Uhde] I have no legal training. Nevertheless, I was interested, for instance, in the unicameral parliamentary system and in specific ideas concerning the office of the president of the Slovak Republic. The Czech side is still discussing these issues. I think that in this respect the Slovak constitution is a source of inspiration; in return, we promise that as soon as part of our constitution is finished, we'll make our working text available to our Slovak partners; we are not going to keep it a secret.

[Pinter] Will the Czech constitution permit the government of the Czech Republic to convoke the parliament, as does the draft of the Slovak constitution?

[Uhde] So far we have not dealt with such specifics. Nevertheless, I don't think that we will grant such rights to our government because our side is still trying to separate in its theses—the legislative from the administrative—and judicial powers as much as possible, for example, in order to avoid in the future a situation where a deputy would simultaneously be a member of the government and vote in the plenum expression of confidence to the same government in which he serves.

[Pinter] Have you discussed specifically how to engage deputies of the Federal Assembly in case the parliament is dissolved?

[Uhde] That problem has not been on today's agenda. We believe that it is a problem of a complex conception which the Federal Assembly must provide. We are prepared to serve in the role of national councils.

[Pinter] And your personal opinion?

[Uhde] I think that it would not be an advantageous step. Although it is alleged that any decision of the legislative bodies is feasible, I find it rather difficult to imagine such a moment.

[Pinter] Quite a few citizens think that new elections are announced automatically at the moment new states are founded.

[Uhde] That idea is favored mainly by people who believe that it would make up for their loss in June. In that case, I think the results of our recent elections would be even more accentuated. In spite of that, I would not dwell on this idea because new elections are a means of solution when no other

alternatives are available. Instead, we should try to overcome the difficult period that we are experiencing and look for other solutions besides new elections.

[Pinter] What is your estimate of the operational timetable of the commissions of experts?

[Uhde] The schedule is set up correctly, but problems that the commission might encounter in its proceedings cannot be foreseen. Nevertheless, we think that our experts should be able to chart the situation by 14 August, deputies from individual committees should join them on or about 17 August, and the outline for the cooperation of our two independent nations should be completed before the end of August.

### 'Terrorists' Call for 'Destruction of System'

AU1908124292

[Editorial Report] Czech and Slovak newspapers from 14 to 18 August publish a number of reports on, and reactions to, a manifesto issued by a group calling itself "Revolutionary Guerrilla Autonomy" (Revolucni partyzanska autonomie), which was published in the "anarchists' journal A-KONTRA."

Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech on 14 August on page 3 carries a 500-word "ina"-signed report entitled "Revolutionary Guerrilla Autonomy Calls for the Destruction of the Present System." The report states that "in one of its latest issues" the anarchists' journal A-KONTRA published "Proclamation Number One" by "a group of Czechoslovak young people associated in the Revolutionary Guerrilla Autonomy (RPA)." In this proclamation the RPA activists reportedly "avow their allegiance to the traditions of infamous terrorist groups such as the German RAF or the Italian Red Brigades." The MLADA FRONTA DNES report says: "In the Proclamation Number One they state that although the pacifist method of asserting some views is to be preferred from the ethical viewpoint, the situation is increasingly convincing them that a number of problems cannot be resolved by peaceful forms of political negotiations. 'We have therefore decided to resort in our desperation to energetic acts that will be meaningful for us at least as self-defense against the unlimited power of the government, the state apparatus, and some business circles,' write the 'guerrillas' in the document, which ends with the words: 'Death to the Rotten System. Long Live the RPA!!!"

The MLADA FRONTA DNES report goes on to quote an unidentified "expert on terrorism from the Federal Criminal Police" on the above document. The expert says: "Although the RPA could be a few lunatics, we have to take the document of this group seriously, given the fact that today it is no problem to get hold of any explosive. We do not know how far it is from their words to deeds. Starting to act only after something happens could be too late."

Prague CESKE A MORAVSKOSLEZSKE NOVINY in Czech on 17 August on page 2 carries a 200-word "VIS"-signed report entitled "Dissociation From a Provocation." The report states that the Left Alternative—Movement for a Democratic and Self-Governed Socialism has "resolutely dissociated itself" from the RPA's "Proclamation," the text

of which it considers to be a "transparent provocation." According to the Left Alternative, the activities of terrorist groups "run totally counter to the true political goals of the left and objectively serve the interests of aggressive and authoritarian right-wing forces." This is why the Left Alternative regards the publication of the RPA's "Proclamation" by A-KONTRA as a "gross political mistake," the report says.

Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech on 18 August on page 2 carries a 500-word "ina"-signed report entitled "A-KONTRA: Dialogue With Terrorists." The report gives an account of a news conference given by Jakub Polak, chief editor of A-KONTRA, in Prague on 17 August. At the news conference Polak defended the publication of the RPA's document in his journal, saying that the aim of the publication was to "bring about a dialogue with people from the RPA" and thereby "prevent terrorist acts." Polak asserted that his editorial office "does not have any contact with the authors of the Proclamation."

Polak's news conference is also subject of a 400-word CSTK report published by Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 18 August on page 2. The report specifies that Proclamation Number One was published in issue No. 10 to 13 of A-KONTRA and that it was signed "Marco Cerrados." According to the CSTK report, Polak, who is member of the Left Alternative Coordinating Committee, also rejected the Left Alternative's criticism of the publication of the RPA document by his journal. Polak reportedly argued that the Left Alternative's statement of 16 August was "the private initiative of Left Alternative member J. Puchmeltr" and "does not reflect the position of the majority of Left Alternative members."

### Housing Market, Policy, Cooperatives Viewed

92CH0820C Prague EKONOM in Czech  
No 27, 3-9 Jul 92 p 27

[Interview with Ivan Prikryl, chairman of the Union of Czech and Moravian Housing Cooperatives, by Anna Cervenkova; place and date not given: "The Housing Market—Housing Policy and Cooperatives"]

[Text] In EKONOM No. 24, we informed our readers regarding the legal provision through which the Presidium of the Federal Assembly amended that portion of the transformation law that deals with the transfer of cooperative apartments to the ownership of cooperative members. This legal provision is only a sort of emergency provision to make the transfer of apartments possible in accordance with the transformation law. We asked the chairman of the Union of Czech and Moravian Housing Cooperatives, attorney Ivan Prikryl, about the extent to which these incursions were in accord with the state housing policy.

[Prikryl] I do not wish to be malicious, but one cannot speak of any kind of housing policy in this country at all. From the very beginning, housing policy has been poorly conceptualized on a systems-wide basis. I expected the constitutional authorities of this state to understand that it is necessary to be clear about the fundamental systems questions and only

then to go into details. This did not occur. No functional sketch of the system on which one could build was created.

[Cervenkova] Which questions do you consider to be key from this standpoint?

[Prikryl] It is primarily the identification of the social function of dwelling, and I would include the question of protecting renters and the statute on generally beneficial housing cooperatives here. Next, it is a problem of ownership—to make ownership of apartments possible, but not to provide preferential treatment. Finally, it is necessary to define the fundamental rules for transferring ownership—who, how, to whom, and at what price? Political representatives should come to agreement on the fundamental responses to these questions and only then should they be handed over to a team of specialists who will then be plugging in their complexities. Not the other way around.

In this phase of realization, the economic reform urgently requires the reform of housing. Housing policy can be a pillar that supports the economic transformation or it can be a detonator that causes an explosion. This is not a call for state paternalism; on the contrary, this will be an unpopular matter, but it is necessary to tell people clearly and specifically the sense and intent of the prepared measures. Evasion and maneuvering cause uncertainty, which could come home to roost. That is why we at the Union of Czech and Moravian Housing Cooperatives want to initiate direct contacts with the Association for the Protection of Renters and with the Union of Building Owners. We, the cooperative members, are such a hybrid of owners and renters and we wish to search out those points upon which agreement is possible and find those conflicting questions that must be solved by an independent entity.

[Cervenkova] One of these conflicting questions concerns the ownership of land plots.

[Prikryl] We must see to it that the land plots on which a house stands are owned by cooperatives. We cannot visualize how full ownership of a housing unit can be accomplished without transferring the appropriate land.

[Cervenkova] It is very likely that "mixed" buildings will come into being—some of the apartments owned by renters, some will be in cooperative ownership. Will not the land agenda then be terribly complicated?

[Prikryl] Yes, it is possible that as many as 30 co-owners may be registered; that can be solved. Another question is the price of the land plot. Currently, it is not possible to use market prices; that would be exceedingly harsh. However, at the same time, I do not believe that the right of permanent use of a land plot, such as it is vested today in cooperatives, should be transferred free of charge to different ownership. The price of transferring a part of the land plot to different ownership should not result in living costs that are higher than, say, 5 percent for the owner of the dwelling unit.

[Cervenkova] And what about location rents, for example, in the center of the city of Prague or in resort towns?

[Prikryl] That will be a matter for the communities, which should not permit any other handling of land plots than for purposes of dwelling in order to prevent land speculation.

[Cervenkova] So what should a regular cooperative member do in this situation?

[Prikryl] It is very difficult to be an adviser. Each cooperative member has the right to request transfer of a dwelling unit until 28 July. By concluding an agreement on the transfer, he then assumes the obligation to pay off the remainder of the investment credit.

We shall submit to our members certain variations of the solution; we shall inform them regarding their rights, and we will make it possible for them, even as future owners, to remain in the cooperative, but a number of people want to "jump out" of the cooperative. I do not believe that such a decision is wise. A building is an item of collective chattel that must also be administered as such—after all, it is not possible for each member to bring individual payments to the boiler room. Cooperatives can engage in administrative activities, even for buildings that are fully "owned" by owners—on a contractual basis. Of course, this will call for a change in the approach involved in directing some cooperatives for these new customers: It will require eliminating the habit of ordering people about, of having a superior attitude, and it will require the elimination of bureaucracy.

### High-Risk Groups for Unemployment Examined

92CH0820B Prague EKONOM in Czech  
No 27, 3-9 Jul 92 p 25

[Article by Marie Frydmanova: "Social Investigations—Unemployment: The Risk Groups"]

[Text] The transformation of the Czechoslovak economy is accompanied by a number of manifestations, which this economy is encountering for the first time in five decades. The situation in the labor market has resulted in open unemployment and in this context the fact that the growth of overemployment is not declining according to the most recent estimates appears to be the paradox.

Despite the fact that the current level of unemployment is not high in any way in comparison with developed economies, the maintenance of the unemployment rate within acceptable limits and the elimination of deepening regional differences will be one of the future conditions and prerequisites for assuring the acceptance and the social toleration of the additional steps involved in the transformation of the Czechoslovak economy.

An analysis of the situation in the labor market points up not only the differentiated structural profile and the specific regional differences, but also identifies the risk groups among the population that are more threatened by unemployment. The identification of threatened groups is particularly important to the formation of programs intended to increase employment among those members of the population. From the standpoint of the classification structure (similar to advanced market economies), the at-risk groups include people with lower levels of education who generally

have a lower degree of adaptability toward possible requalification and, for the most part, even have less of an inclination to engage in private enterprise. It is likely that a number of them can become permanent participants in the social safety net.

From the standpoint of age structure, it is disturbing and difficult to explain that unemployment in the CSFR (in contrast to developed countries) impacts primarily on the most productive age groups with unemployed people under 39 years of age accounting for three-fourths of the total number of unemployed.

The most at-risk social groups from the standpoint of employment in advanced economies include young people up to 25 years of age (primarily those who are vying for their first jobs). This social group lacks not only practical experience and work habits, but also the necessary professional and social contacts which facilitate mobility and adaptability in the labor market. It is, therefore, not a happenstance that even in our country this portion of the population is more heavily impacted than is the average and even despite the effectivity of measures, which have been taken (assistant and practitioner jobs), the extent of their unemployment is higher than the overall extent of unemployment (in Italy, Spain, and France, the measure of unemployment for persons up to 25 years of age is a multiple of the measure of overall unemployment; in the FRG, however, the situation is reversed).

Also, the higher unemployment rate among women confirms the worldwide trend because, in the majority of developed nations, the number of women is greater than 50 percent in terms of total unemployment.

The at-risk groups threatened by unemployment also include minority population groups and persons with handicaps. Within the framework of minority groups in Czechoslovakia, this statement primarily involves persons of Romany origin.

Foreign experiences indicate that the long-term unemployed, who in the majority of countries account for a surprisingly high portion of the total number of unemployed (for example, in Belgium, Spain, Italy, and in the Netherlands, the long-term unemployed account for more than 50 percent of total unemployment; this number is lower than 10 percent in Norway and Sweden), are among those workers that are the most difficult to place. Long-term unemployment particularly threatens women entering the labor market after maternity leave, young people striving for their first jobs, older persons, and minorities. Even though the number of long-term unemployed in Czechoslovakia, in comparison with other countries, is extremely low (9.2 percent), it can be anticipated that this number will rise in conjunction with the expected developments in the labor market this year.

Because it is generally true that preventive measures are less costly than subsequent measures, active employment policy should concentrate attention upon the creation of programs for the at-risk groups whose standing in the labor market will be deteriorating.

**FKGP Called 'Antidemocratic Demagogues'**

92CH0809A Budapest MAGYAR NARANCS  
in Hungarian 24 Jun 92 p 4

[Article by Tibor Legradi: "The Shaman and the Mild-Mannered Ones"]

[Text] *Is Torgyan the only populist monster? Or is the entire FKGP [Independent Smallholders Party] an assembly of antidemocratic demagogues who rely on the farmers' neuroses? The author of the following article, a politician who at one time was close to the party, appears to be arguing in support of the latter view.*

Jozsef Torgyan had been ruling the Smallholders Party "peacefully" for roughly a year. Political analysts were almost beginning to believe that this stormy movement had finally found a charismatic leader and, therefore, no further palace revolutions were to be expected for the time being. And then suddenly, but according to a familiar scenario, a coup was staged. The viziers—who, naturally, bypassed democratic procedures but cited the party's constitution—forced the grand vizier to resign. He in turn followed tradition, by sending the "party's army" into action (for a change, it was armed with flagstaves). Another difference was that on this occasion, thanks to Hirado [Newsmagazine], millions of television viewers were able to watch the brawl, to the accompaniment of swinging flagstaves and loud curses.

Perhaps many people are now heaving a sigh of relief. They are hoping that Torgyan's reign will soon end and control of the Smallholders Party will revert to mild-mannered individuals, the party's 35 members of parliament who are acting as guardians of historical traditions.

**Smallholders' Standard**

But the fact is that these individuals are so mild-mannered because Jozsef Torgyan had pulled their fangs. In the course of the conflicts that followed the party's reactivation, it was the 80-year-old Tivadar Partay, whom Istvan G. Palfy called the Smallholders' standard in one telecast of A Het [The Week in Review], and his vassals who elevated to the level of a behavioral model the playing of the role of leader, the infiltration hysteria, the use of intrigue to influence public opinion, and the resolution of conflicts by force. The party's reactivation itself began with a row. After the singing of the national anthem, Tivadar Partay declared the party reactivated, and then he announced (!) the party's leadership. Barely two minutes later, Gyorgy Balogh (he is now chairman of the National Assembly's Defense Committee) entered into an argument with Partay, because the latter had assigned him merely the post of party director (in charge of economic matters), rather than the general secretaryship he felt was his due. (A typical nuance was that the first leadership list included one of Partay's sons who had never engaged in politics. Similarly, Gyorgy Balogh subsequently provided parliamentary seats for his daughter, who likewise had not been active in politics, and for a former collaborator, by putting them on the national list.)

Then, instead of seeking a compromise, Tivadar Partay launched a demagogic attack against the leaders of the Bela

Kovacs Political Society (they included Jozsef Antall, Arpad Goncz, and Vince Voros, among others) in an attempt to make them eat humble pie, because they had opposed the party's reactivation and had not recognized the decision-making authority of the group put together by Partay.

The party's first convention in March 1989 was more scandalous than any of its subsequent conventions. Sandor Olah and Sandor Bejczy staged a brawl in public, and manipulated the delegates. Gyorgy Balogh directed the obstructing and bullying detachment. The night before the Erd convention held three months later, it was again Gyorgy Balogh who reveled with the delegates, to ensure adoption of his leadership list the next day by weary delegates longing to go home. That is how parliamentary seats were won by the 14 leaders subsequently disqualified at the next convention, which had been postponed until after the elections. Along the way there were numerous expulsions, fights, the suspension of a deputy general secretary, a call for loyalty oaths, and a party split. Opponents, of course, were removed without following democratic procedures, while citing the party's constitution. However, that document defined merely the party's organizational structure, but not the scopes of decisionmaking authority within the party. Between the two elections, when a clique of Antall supporters put together the coalition with the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] through what practically amounted to a coup, Sandor Bejczy declared without further ado that it was childish of the protesters to cite the party constitution. Istvan Prepeliczay, the party's general secretary at the time, played the leading role in the unlawful acts. Later he and his SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] leanings lost out through such fraud.

**Infiltration Hysteria**

KIS UJSAG intensified the party's angry and hateful aspect. That is where the offended, frustrated, and superficially coarse political tone typical of MAGYAR FORUM and UJ MAGYARORSZAG first emerged in the Hungarian press. Tivadar Partay was the paper's editor in chief, and Miklos Omolnar was its editor.

Partay and Omolnar directed the anti-Torgyan campaign that unfolded in KIS UJSAG before the elections. Flagrantly abusing their rights as editors, and disregarding the elementary rules of journalistic (and Christian) ethics, they reviled Torgyan in the most objectionable manner, week after week. It does not excuse their conduct that, in the given case, they were politically right. A particularly unscrupulous move on Omolnar's part was to intentionally falsify the course of the previously expelled Karoly Ravasz's career, in accordance with the logic of communist show trials, and to stitch together the entire history of all previous scandals and expulsions into a story of communist infiltration, weaving the threads as far as Torgyan. Even though a case for his impeachment at that time was still nowhere.

Since then Omolnar, Olah, and Partay have inflated the file against Torgyan into a lifework, and have filled the media with statements about the specter of an international communist mafia standing behind Torgyan. In accordance with the usual pattern of paranoid behavior, they began to

persecute anyone holding contrasting views, while failing to notice that a presumably real agent had wormed his way into their confidence. For Vilmos Bereczki, who later was suspected of being an agent, had played a leading role in the scandals before the Torgyan period.

In the struggle against Torgyan in 1990, the O [Omolnar, Olah] group gained a semiannual victory in December. But the great soapbox orator turned out to be a tough opponent who did not hesitate to use the same below-the-belt methods the group itself had been using earlier: namely, demagoguery to influence the party members' mood, force, etc. State certification of the lists of candidates made things easier for Torgyan, in that thereafter the O group was unable to sideline him from politics, the way it had sidelined its earlier opponents.

Following their great intraparty defeat, the relatively talented Sandor Olah and Miklos Omolnar, or Geza Zsiros, who skillfully avoided the landmines and could present genuine credentials as a smallholder, and all the other members of the faction switched to a more moderate tone. They had been left with no leg to stand on, and their self-confidence had vanished. Admittedly, they had also learned the rules of the game in politics, and that too had a beneficial effect upon their behavior. Therefore it is no wonder that the anger of the Smallholder masses, which they had been stoking earlier, swept over their heads.

The mentality and political behavior typical of the Smallholders Party are not the work of Torgyan, nor of his opponents who hardly differ from him. At most they, including Torgyan, are responsible "merely" for being influenced by their career ambitions in letting that mentality and political behavior concentrate in their party.

#### Collectivization Neurosis

In 1961 and 1970, a medical team conducted a comprehensive medical screening of the 620 residents in a Hungarian village whose standard of living was average. The results of the screening are shocking even today: 30 and 42 percent of the over-15 population, respectively, suffered from neuroses. And as evident, the proportion of neurotics rose parallel with the living standard's rise. Therefore we have no reason to assume that this proportion has declined in the 20 years since then. The screening revealed that the incidence of neuroses was higher among the more prosperous farmers, and that the tensions generated by collectivization played a significant role in this. The judgments of neurotics and their responses to conflicts are strongly influenced by emotions. Neurotics tend to be prejudicial in their thinking and are predisposed to hysteria. It is difficult to reach them through rational arguments. (Two serious economic experts who had worked for the Smallholders Party, and had published regularly in KIS UJSAG, lined up cogent arguments in support of reprivatization. It is typical that their arguments found no response within the party, not even among the party's leaders.)

Anyone who discovers how the frustrations and neurotic inclinations of mostly elderly persons can be utilized for political ends, with how simple (black-and-white) truths their thirst for victory can be quenched, and how their

emotions can be manipulated, will find passionate supporters in them. Torgyan has grown above the others by purposefully and unscrupulously taking advantage of opportunities to manipulate the masses. His supporters fail to notice that he is deceiving them, because, like a modern shaman, he enters fully into the spirit of the ceremony. The others are unable to do that, or do not have the stomach for it.

The mentality of the Smallholder masses superficially resembles the style of Western populist politics. Both phenomena are associated in some respect with the social strata of losers. Our tragedy is that the agony of a wide social class, which started off so promisingly in the first half of this century along the road to the peasantry's embourgeoisement, has been caused not by lagging behind in competition, but by political disasters. These people are vanquished, rather than losers. And they are legion indeed. It will be all right as long as a significant proportion of them do not become interested in politics, as long as the likes of Torgyan are arguing on their behalf, and as long as groups of have-been intellectuals do not join them. Meanwhile, coups will come and go.

#### Convicted Spy Interviewed; Claims Innocence

92CH0808A Budapest REFORM in Hungarian  
18 Jun 92 p 5

[Interview with Rudolf Szanto, a former junior lieutenant convicted of spying for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, by "Samu"; place and date not given: "Mr. Szanto, the Sucker Spy"]

[Text] *Perhaps no criminal trial in recent memory has attracted more public attention than the trial of Junior Lieutenant Rudolf Szanto, accused of spying. On 13 May 1992, the Military Bench of the Budapest Court, the court of first instance, finally put an end to the guessing and speculation: It found him guilty of the felony of espionage and sentenced him to 12 years of imprisonment as his principal penalty. The conviction and sentence are under appeal. Before and immediately after sentencing, Rudolf Szanto refused to be interviewed by reporters. REFORM is the first paper to obtain an interview from him.*

[Samu] I received permission to show you my collection of press clippings on the Szanto case. You were muttering quite a lot during their perusal. Why?

[Szanto] This thing has been exaggerated out of all proportions. Judging merely by the headlines such as "Belgrade's Spy" and "Where Is the Spy's Money?" something very serious is supposed to have happened here. But there is no question of anything like that. The whole thing has been overblown.

[Samu] If Rudolf Szanto is not a spy, then what is he? A sucker?

[Szanto] I do not even know how to answer your questions. I never had in mind anything like the charges brought against me. The fact is that an elder male cousin introduced me to Yugoslav intelligence officers. But the charge that I was spying is entirely without foundation. Look, I admit

that I am guilty of what my defense attorney defines as offering to spy, of agreeing to work for Yugoslav intelligence. On closer examination, however, I merely talked about matters that were public knowledge. I had gathered from newspapers everything I told them. I was not given any assignments. They merely asked me to notify them of Soviet troop movements, or to phone them if the Soviet troops start moving toward the border. But one of the experts at the trial testified that Belgrade would have been bombed long before I could have phoned.

[Samu] In your latest assignment you were in charge of a unit that interpreted aerial photographs. To what secrets did you have access?

[Szanto] We did not have access to any secret information. Of course, all aerial photographs had to be stamped "Top Secret," but I hardly think that what the photographs themselves actually showed—the steeple of a village church, for instance—was such a big secret. And what I knew, or could have found out, about the Soviets was likewise nothing of importance. Look, I never liked spy films or novels and was never interested in them. However, I did learn subsequently that agents had to submit reports. But I never wrote down anything. There were years when I did not even meet the Yugoslavs. When we did meet, they asked me questions and occasionally made notes.

[Samu] But, to the extent that anything could be learned about the trial, it allegedly centered around a notebook that had been classified "Top Secret" and had been confiscated from you. It contained Hungarian military data.

[Szanto] It is true that the notebook contained data about which I could not have learned in the course of my official duties. But I felt that the data in question were necessary for my work. I made notes on what I heard from a soldier I had served with, but I also saw reports about those matters on TV. I told the court that the data were necessary for my work. An expert at the trial confirmed that, if the occasion had arisen, we might have been able to prepare brilliant interpretations with the help of that notebook. And if I had really been spying, do you think I would have left in my safe a notebook prepared in 1989? Such incriminating evidence?

[Samu] The court established that you had supplied information about the No. 101 Reconnaissance Squadron in Tazsar.

[Szanto] I could not even have had any knowledge of such information and, in my opinion, they failed to prove that I had supplied it. First Lieutenant I.F. kept asserting that I had revealed the information in question, and I kept denying that I had. I.F. too knew about the notebook, and so did others.

[Samu] Are we talking about the same First Lieutenant I.F. whom you recruited for spying?

[Szanto] I did not recruit anyone. I merely told I.F. about the whole thing and asked him whether he wanted to talk about the Soviets. Because perhaps he too would have welcomed assistance toward a vacation or two at the seashore.

[Samu] For 12 years of "talking," a sucker gets, asks, or accepts merely 150,000 forints.

[Szanto] Since my arrest, many people have asked me how could I have been such a fool. But somehow money was never of primary importance. I never asked for money. There never was an amount agreed to in advance. Nothing like that.

[Samu] One of the newspapers assumes that you will be drawing on your Swiss and other bank accounts once you are free.

[Szanto] I do not have any bank accounts, except a giro account with the OTP [National Savings Bank]. And there is also a pile of loans to repay, because everything in our home has been purchased on credit. With three children to support, there was not much left to spend. And now the family is really flooded.

[Samu] An inoperable miniature camera has been returned to you. Was that your "equipment"?

[Szanto] They did not give me any equipment. That camera was a present I received nearly 10 years ago. It never worked properly.

[Samu] Tell me, did you ever notice that you were under surveillance?

[Szanto] No, and I never checked to see whether I was being followed or anything like that. I never considered what I was doing as being something so serious. True, there was information about Tazsar. I told the Yugoslavs there were 15 Sukhoys in Tazsar, and who was the commander there. But, in my opinion, even the Albanians knew that. Anyone could have known, even without asking. All the Yugoslavs asked was whether there was any mention of Yugoslav matters at party membership meetings. Well, there wasn't.

[Samu] Were you never urged to provide Hungarian military information?

[Szanto] Once I was asked to acquire a copy of the telephone book of one of the higher headquarters. But when that came up, I immediately said it was out of the question; I would not agree to anything like that.

[Samu] Are you mad at I.F. for informing against you?

[Szanto] I am not mad at him, although he had learned very nicely what in the end he had to say. We were friends, we even went fishing together quite often. It was he whom the Yugoslavs asked about Tazsar. Because, obviously, they had not learned anything about it from me. I was not interested in these technical matters or other installations.

[Samu] Yet reporters also assumed that we have Rudolf Szanto to "thank" for the bombing of Barcs.

[Szanto] I do not know how to fly an airplane. But I would assume that a plane, if it wanted to, could enter a country's airspace whenever and wherever it chose to do so. I was completely shocked to hear that they want to blame me also for what happened at Barcs, to defame me with such nonsense. That is a childish invention, or what should I call it. Of course, it could also be malicious speculation.

[Samu] Is it true that an expert pointed out at your trial that the things you had "talked about" are absolutely no secret these days?

[Szanto] Something like that was actually said, and that is why I was astonished by the 12-year sentence. Usually such a stiff sentence is not imposed these days, except perhaps for murder committed in the course of a robbery. You know, there was also another thing I did not like very much. The sentence was ready in less than an hour and a half. Please do not misunderstand. I am not an expert in these things. But perhaps that much time was too short for deliberation prior to conviction and sentencing.

[Samu] How much do you expect to get on appeal?

[Szanto] I don't know. I am unable to see clearly in this affair. I really have no idea about what is happening here.

[Samu] Did somebody need a sucker?

[Szanto] Perhaps. I don't know. I no longer understand anything of this whole affair.

**Charges of Anti-Semitism Said Exaggerated**  
*92CH0799 Budapest HETI MAGYARORSZAG*  
*in Hungarian 19 Jun 92 p 11*

[Article by Karoly Alexa: "Julia, Ivan, Mihaly, and the Others: 1992-43?"]

[Text] I am afraid that we, the everyday citizens of Hungary, have no idea what a horrible place we live in, what demons from what hells are sneaking and zigzagging among us—but especially inside us. To be sure, there are numerous newspapers, influential (independent) cultural magazines, and a number of radio and television programs that do not fail to point out—if necessary, by adding one false rumor to another—what is going on here and what will be going on here.... If ostriches lived in Asia, where we come from, and in Mucsa [imaginary town of Hungarian "rednecks"], where we are and where we belong, I would say it is the ostrich policy of Asia and Mucsa to bury our heads in the sand in view of "obvious" facts and desperate screams. Now we will have to pay the price for not heeding the statements, warnings, and lessons of Gyorgy Konrad, the intellectual giant, as one alleges practically a Nobel prize winner, at the time of the first so-called free elections. "The strategy of small nations is separatist, anxious, and hostile.... Anticomunism is slowly being replaced by anti-Semitism." These were his predictions fired by the zeal of a Cassandra. The "small nation" is, of course, a coward and a snob. If it does not listen to the writer from its very soul, its better self blowing the whistle from within (Zrinyi), as it were, maybe it will heed the judgment from without, from a liberal as well as conservative and impartial Europe.

I would like to draw attention to a touching article from the 4 May issue of the London TIMES. The work opens with a picture in which people are breaking and treading on a five-pointed star. The caption says: "The star is fallen: In 1990, Hungarians are crushing the emblem of Communism. Now a new tyranny is on the rise." This is followed by the short but comprehensive title: "Free Discrimination." The subtitle: "Democracy for several minorities in Hungary

means being terrorized in school." The article, the work of a certain Julia Smith, puts the misery of two ethnic minorities in Hungary in the limelight: that of the Jews (?) and that of black (?) university students. And the two main reasons for the atrocities: A turn to fascism creeping and crawling from under the cover of democracy and that of a Christian regime. We must shamefacedly express our thanks for the information to our Julia who, although unknown to us, knows us so well. For instance: "The majority of the country's teachers and parents wants the new law (on education) to forbid discrimination against students belonging to ethnic minorities, which has assumed frightening levels in the past few months." Unfortunately, we must do without the statistics backing up this assertion—Julia's informers from Hungary probably did not want to exasperate her and discourage her from busying herself with us. If the article provides no facts, it is not lacking in explanations: "The violently nationalistic Hungarians have never been famous for their racial tolerance." It seems—at least I think she thinks—that even the lesson of Trianon, which was preceded by a similar wave of exposures, was not enough for them (us).... "Racial intolerance even sneaks into the teaching materials." Yes. Then, we have to be confronted with the description of two tragic cases. "Laszlo Frankel is 10 years old; at the moment, he lives in Israel, far from his place of birth, Budapest. 'We emigrated, because he was constantly teased in school,' says his father, Sandor, a former leader of the Jewish community. 'As soon as he entered the classroom, his so-called friends ran to open the window to get rid of the smell of Auschwitz gas that allegedly entered the room with my son.'" The calvary of the 14-year-old Andras Nagy is related by his mother who is (was) a university lecturer. "The parents of my son's friends did not allow them to play together, because my son is Jewish.... We appealed to the director of the school, who said: 'This is Hungary. If you don't like it, go to Israel.'" Is there anyone who is not moved by these two stories, and who is not charmed by the consideration with which the author of the article spares the readers in Great Britain from exact data? I would have been interested to learn, for instance, where exactly these quoted conversations occurred. In Israel, Paris, or perhaps Hungary? At any rate, it is surprising that the Hungarian press which, having tasted freedom, is wont to repeat even facts that did not and do not exist—someone offered a barrel to Jews in parliament [as published]; Katalin Hanak was chastised on nationalist grounds, and did not utter a word about the exodus of the children of such prominent parents. Could it be that it has already been intimidated to such an extent?

In my opinion, we cannot talk about either one option or the other. And it is time to stop the irony. These matters are too wretched and debasing for it to be appropriate to joke about them for long.

I do not think and especially do not claim that the efforts and "topicalization" campaigns of that camp among the Hungarian press, which calls itself independent—that is to say, not dependent on the interests of the coalition parties and the capital and ideology surrounding them, but rather on other party interests, capital, and ideology—is directed by a secret operative organ or brain trust. (By topicalization

I mean now the force with which mass communication determines what should be talked about from among the mass of real or imaginary facts.) Of course I have impressions; I am not lacking in ideas, and I have no doubt about the reasons and goals of numerous waves of topicalization. At any rate, we can regard with a bittersweet serenity the grammatical coincidences (to put it mildly) discernible in the scattered texts of a wave of topicalization; these texts are dropped before the gentle reader's feet as the fruit of the heuristic impressions, personal confessions, and private ways of thinking of their authors—of well-known, award-winning writers and journalists.

In contrast to many journalists, I do not want to burden anyone with my personal fantasies and explanations, but I do not intend to suppress the fact that I consider certain topics eminently dangerous, vile, and provocatively dangerous to the interests of the nation (if I may use this word). One of these is the topic of the threat of "an increasing anti-Semitism," occasionally masked as "intolerance and hate towards those who are different." This topic is functioning again as a method of political pressure that is not content with simple mudslinging and the magnification of unimportant bits of information, but does not even shrink back from panic-mongering. And, sadly, I am forced to designate it as a political provocation that even seems to forget about the fundamental interests of the topicalizers themselves.

I cannot tell who started to clear his throat for this slander aria; for me, the overture was an interview with Hungarian actor Ivan Darvas (MAGYAR HIRLAP 11 April 1992). I am thinking about outbursts by our decrepit Liliomfi [theater character], sharing his visions on the alleged coalition slogan of "majority-minority," such as: "Those who were already alive before World War II recognize this phraseology as familiar. They know very well what comes after such a division. First, the insignificant minority is ordered to shut up; then, the first law on Jews is passed, the *numerus clausus* [quota]...then comes the *numerus nullus* [ban], the ghetto, the brickyard, and finally, Auschwitz."

This is the melodic line that is winding its way among the others, as well, sometimes in a quieter tone, sometimes with a similar rattle. It is to be found in Kornis's *Screams* (he has recently changed over to this genre). He sees an "anti-democratic power madness," "it is not even certain that I will stay alive," "it is possible the present year is 1939 or 1943," etc. (MAGYAR NARANCS, No. 2, 1992; 168 ORA, 2 June 1992). Let us recall Popper, pastor-representative Ivanyi's vision, hardly in the spirit of the New Testament, kneading gypsies, Los Angeles, and the Jews into one; Gyorgy Konrad's ode to Goncz (deporting wagons and *laudatio* [praise]); expert Csepeli's tractate in the KURIR.... Those constructed issues of newspapers—for instance, 168 ORA 2 June, NEPSZABADSAG 3 and 4 June—in which the editorial screams, the insidious articles, and the letters to the editor all rhyme with each other. And then we have not even mentioned Gado, Gador, Andrasew, and the like. And the topical background of the topic—the media discussion, the delicate details of compensation for Jews, etc.

I am not bringing this article to an end. Let this matter not end at such a point! I am only breaking it off, with the same exquisite expression with which Sandor Radnoti closed his interview in the June issue of KRITIKA, which fits very well with our topic: "Cool it."

### Budget Revision Resisted Despite Large Deficit

92CH0781A Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG  
in Hungarian 27 Jun 92 pp 91-92

[Article by Aniko Szanto: "Supplementary 1992 Budget; Random Math"]

[Text] *Data of the 1992 budget, which was achieved by the government coalition, have proved to be "random figures," and, yet, the administration has no intention of preparing a modified budget. True, the international financial institutions, which continue to look at Hungary as a showcase for East Europe, are not forcing the issue sufficiently, although this, among other things, is precisely how the administration is thwarting its much-advertised program of growth.*

Finance Ministry officials now estimate that the state budget's originally planned 1992 deficit of 70 billion forints (Ft) will actually be Ft160-180 billion and, according to their experts, even a Ft230-billion deficit is possible. (Incidentally, the latter would approach 9 percent of GDP. The reason why the International Monetary Fund recently warned Italy to tidy up its budget was that the deficit was in excess of 10 percent of GDP.) It is possible, for instance, that the state treasury will not have a single forint of revenue from banks, although Ft63 billion were expected. The treasury's optimism, which expected an economic recession of only 7-8 percent for last year and a growth for this year, will allegedly result in a loss of Ft30 billion in corporate taxes in 1992. If the number of unemployed will grow to 750,000 to 800,000 instead of the estimated 500,000 to 550,000, the state treasury will be forced to make a contribution of at least Ft20 billion for financing the solidarity fund.

Despite the "bankrupt" budget, "smoke screening" has been going on since March, as FIDESZ [Alliance of Young Democrats] representative Mihaly Varga, interpellating twice in the matter on 10 March and 2 June, put it. The events apparently accelerated last week. Following the Thursday cabinet meeting, the spokesman publicly announced that the administration, after checking with the International Monetary Fund's mission that is arriving in Hungary on Monday, will submit its supplementary budget proposal to parliament during the special parliamentary session, i.e., by Wednesday of this week. This means, however, that the administration "is of the opinion that only the total amount of budget revenues needs to be modified, and is requesting at the same time that parliament give it the authority to finance the larger deficit," the spokesman informs us. Thus, there is no word about decreasing expenditures.

However, according to the news, the decrease in the central budget institutions' subsidies, which was implemented last spring in violation of the 1992 budget law but which was called temporary, would now be made permanent; social

security would get more than Ft2 billion less; the special state money funds would get Ft3 billion less; and the accumulation of special tax-free surplus by the commercial banks would come under tighter control through a modification of the law on financial institutes.

The government spokesman's statement did not mention whether the administration, similar to last December's rush, would want parliament to work day and night discussing the supplementary budget yet this week, but one thing is certain: The Antall cabinet still does not want to open a debate on the budget as a whole. Its proposal is strictly limited to making it possible for the administration to issue, in addition to the legally approved Ft70 billion, another 100 billion forints' worth of state bonds for financing the larger-than-planned deficit. This is so, even though it was none but Mihaly Kupa who argued in April against a larger-than-planned deficit, saying that "Because of Hungary's external balance of payments and internal savings, the budget deficit could be easily financed, and even a much larger deficit could be financed. However, this should not be allowed, this is why the entire process must be slowed down, for otherwise the already high real interest rates would go even higher, resulting in a stifling effect for ventures."

It was certain that the International Monetary Fund would not become hard-hearted in seeing the larger-than-planned budget deficit. Hungary is solvent; indeed, its surplus balance of payments, according to Hungarian National Bank officials, could be as high as \$1 billion this year. In fact, Jozsef Antall expressed his expectations at the European Reconstruction and Development Bank's general meeting in April: "The world economy cannot allow itself to shatter our hopes of market economy and development in our countries or to undermine our people's confidence in our free and pluralistic political structures." The prime minister was indeed right in that the West was not really prepared to manage East Europe's problems. Although representatives of the International Monetary Fund last fall still insisted that the maximum 1992 budget deficit could not exceed Ft70 billion, in view of the problems of the transition from socialism to a market economy, they will nonetheless remain "understanding" on seeing the expected 160-to-180-billion-forint deficit.

Numerous economists think that a budget deficit is a necessity in the postsocialist countries. "The more the private sector's ratio is increasing in production, the more difficult it becomes to collect taxes," states Janos Kornai, member of the Academy. Of course, this only exacerbates the exceptional decrease in revenues that resulted from the economy's steady decline, while, in the absence of a social consensus, the administration cannot politically allow itself to "back off" from state services (e.g., free health services and education) promised by the former socialist state and implemented by welfare states.

Still, experts react to the huge 1992 budget deficit in two different ways. According to the administration, decreasing the amount of deficit through increased taxes or through a significant decrease in expenditures, with the domino effect (e.g., increasing unemployment) also considered, would only increase the deficit. On the other hand, several of the

opposition's economists think that, no matter how unpopular it may be, the work of decreasing the budget deficit, which obviously requires great effort, can no longer be delayed. So much the more as it is well known that the reason why the state budget deficit can so easily be financed with people's savings is that people do not spend their money, do not make purchases amid the economic recession. Moreover, despite the fact that they are rolling in money, the banks are not being forced to decrease their interest rates on accounts and loans in pace with abating inflation, because the state is willing to pay any amount to patch up the hole in the budget.

For instance, conceivably on the basis of such logic, several commercial banks suspended the sale of deposit certificates and bonds last week, saying that they would rather wait and see what the administration will do about the budget deficit—and will not lower their interest rates until then. However, it is conceivable that their hopes will not materialize this time, for the administration is allegedly planning to decrease the interest rates on treasury bonds, which function as running accounts, from the present 23 percent to 16 percent. But the huge budget deficit keeps interest rates relatively high anyway, continuing to forestall credit applications by entrepreneurs.

"Only dilettante economists or political swindlers can promise any kind of rapid and certain solution," says Janos Kornai. But if, as Marton Tardos (SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats]) queried about it already in April, the administration still does not have a program for managing the crisis of our national economy and, moreover, if it will not begin to "lessen the hyperactive state's role as well as state expenditures," then next year's economic revival, which is allegedly the basis of the 1993 budget policies, will only be a matter of faith again.

Incidentally, the choreography of the modification of this year's budget and the preparation of next year's budget is not much different from that of last year or the year before, although the state treasury crisis is generated, among other things, by the notorious lack of preparation. In 1990, it was still Finance Minister Ferenc Rabar who was fighting Gyorgy Matolcsy, the prime minister's state secretary, but no administration program was worked out during their struggle. In the end, by 1991, the preparation of the budget was due to the fact that Jozsef Antall, to the satisfaction of all parliamentary parties, magically produced internationally renowned Mihaly Kupa for the post of finance minister. Now it is as if there were another magic act in the making—only this time the unanimous approval of the opposition will likely be lacking. The Kupa program, which still exists officially, is being replaced just now—and Mihaly Kupa himself may conceivably be replaced as well—by concepts that would "lay the foundations for economic growth," hallmarked by the name of Tamas Szabo, deputy chairman of the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] and former political state secretary of the Ministry of Finance. The "message" is apparently that a program does already exist but time is needed to work out its details, including the budget reform, and, until then, it is "not worth meddling with" the budget processes. The price of this lack of action

is this: If things continue to proceed as they have been, last year's budget deficit of Ft110 billion could increase to as much as Ft200 or Ft250 billion this year and to Ft400 billion next year.

### **Freemason Grand Master Papp Interviewed**

92CH0808B Budapest MAGYAR NARANCS  
in Hungarian 8 Jul 92 pp 6-7

[Interview with Oszkar Papp, grand master of the Hungarian Grand Oriens, by Ivan Andras Bojar; place and date not given: "Without a Middle Class"]

[Excerpts] [Bojar] How many Freemasons are there in Hungary at present?

[Papp] I am unable to tell you exactly. By my estimate, there may be between 150 and 200 Freemasons, jointly in all the lodges combined. This number seems insignificant if we consider that, at the end of World War I, when freemasonry was proscribed in our country, the more than 100 lodges on the territory of prewar Hungary had between 13,000 and 14,000 members in all. Or even in comparison with 1945-50, when there were between 1,200 and 1,500 Freemasons. [passage omitted]

[Bojar] Does Hungarian freemasonry have some sort of strategy to attract, in addition to prominent politicians, also those strata of the newly rich who are willing to embrace middle-class traditions?

[Papp] We do not have a strategy. At best we have merely concepts and ideas. On the whole, freemasonry is much less "aggressive" than it is generally held to be. In other words, it does not recruit members that way. We are not striving to create an intellectual, financial, or power elite. Rather, our objective is to attract and admit the intellectual and moral elite. We welcome also the players in politics, if they conform to our basic principles and meet our expectations. The role of such germinating organizations must be distinguished from the practice of the Western countries' long-established and smoothly running democracies where freemasonry is present also in the political sphere. It is common knowledge that members of the royal family and several leading politicians are always to be found among the Freemasons in Britain. Churchill and most American presidents were Freemasons. France's French, Latin, or liberal freemasonry, with which also our lodge has links, is numerically smaller than in America, where membership is of the order of one million. In the French National Assembly, however, you will find Freemasons among the deputies of parties sitting on either side of the aisle.

[Bojar] Are the traditions of bourgeois radicalism and liberal ideas not typical of freemasonry?

[Papp] They are, but that again shows variations by cultures and countries. The Anglo-American brand of freemasonry is more inclined toward traditionalism and a degree of conservatism, occasionally going as far as some form of religiosity. It is interesting that in our country, if we consider the antecedents, the progressive orientation is rather typical. It will suffice to point out one workshop of enlightenment, the Jacobin group of Guardsmen writers associated with Martinovics's movement—in other words, Kazinczy, Kossuth, Klapka, Jasz, Ady, or Karinthy.

[Bojar] How could Hungary's present Freemasons be characterized on the basis of these criteria?

[Papp] They cannot, for the time being. The impression I have gained during the brief period since our reorganization is that the drawing away from politics, which is already typical of our society, applies to the Freemasons as well. Intellectuals are the dominant among the handful of Freemasons in Hungary at present, because freemasonry's lower middle-class base is lacking. The experience I gained in France indicates that, thanks to the spirit of fraternalism prevailing in the French lodges, it is quite common there for an architect and a writer to sit down with a gendarme or bistro owner to think and even to work together, without any reservations. That provides an excellent lesson also in democracy. One can learn a lot from interpersonal relations in a community where the ability to think together and a common set of values augment the organic functioning of democracy.

[Bojar] What is the domestic political forces' attitude toward freemasonry?

[Papp] Several groups that can be characterized as political show a perceptible empathy for our values. At the same time, some misinformation and hesitation are also typical. The historical roots of this can perhaps be traced to the proscription of our activities: by Bela Kun and his followers in 1919, because they regarded us as too bourgeois; and by Horthy and his associates in 1920, because they considered us extremely leftist.

[Bojar] Within freemasonry, direct contacts exist with the British and French Governments and the U.S. administration. Is the Hungarian Government or some other political force taking advantage of this opportunity at the level of secret diplomacy?

[Papp] No, not to my knowledge. But this does not have any particular significance. Or perhaps only in the sense that also the present establishment is aware of a kind of recognition freemasonry enjoys in the Western democracies. [passage omitted]

### Survey Views Chances for Preterm Elections

92P20384B Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish  
4 Aug 92 p 3

[Article by D.O.M.: "Do We Want Elections?"]

[Text]

The most popular parties in Poland are the Democratic Union [UD] and the Polish Peasant Party [PSL]. One third of those polled favors preterm parliamentary elections, and over one-half intends to take part in the elections, according to the results of the CBOS [Public Opinion Research Center] July survey.

In your opinion, would preterm elections to the Sejm and Senate be...		
A Good Idea	Not a Good Idea	Do Not Know
36 percent	42 percent	21 percent

Would you take part in the elections?

Yes	No	Do Not Know
53 percent	36 percent	10 percent

Those favoring preterm elections are primarily workers and the unemployed, and also people expressing dissatisfaction with the situation in Poland.

"For which party would you vote?" CBOS asked those who declared their intention to vote, as well as those who were undecided.

The Democratic Union [UD] found itself in first place with 21 percent. Almost half as many of those polled selected PSL (12 percent). Nine percent favored NSZZ Solidarity, and 6 percent—the Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN]. Both the Liberal Democratic Congress [KLD] and the Christian Democratic Union [ZChN] got three percent. The remaining 11 parties were selected by from 0.1 to 2 percent of those surveyed, while 28 percent of this group still does not know for which party they would vote.

The CBOS communique notes that "The people who intend to vote in the elections and support the listed parties are those who are well-off, educated, and interested in politics. People with less education make their decisions just before the elections. The survey results constitute therefore only information about the prevalent mood at this time."

CBOS also asked "What should be the most important issue for those parties that wish to succeed?" As much as 59 percent responded "to maintain law and order in the country." Fifty percent called for the protection of Polish agriculture, and not much fewer (48 percent) called for social protection and equality of citizens. One third said that the most important issue was the protection of the environment, and one quarter the protection of state industry.

The smallest number (nine percent) responded that "Christian values" was the most important issue.

The polling of 1,124 people took place from 16 to 20 July and represented a cross section of adult Poles.

### Progress of Russian Troop Withdrawal Examined

92EP0606A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish  
31 Jul 92 pp 1, 8

[Interview with General Zdzislaw Ostrowski, government plenipotentiary for the temporary stay of Russian Federation troops in Poland, by Maria Wagrowska; place and date not given: "Let Both Players Show Their Cards"]

[Text] [Wagrowska] In a recent interview given to RZECZPOSPOLITA Minister of National Defense Janusz Onyszkiewicz declared that the withdrawal of Russian units from Poland is progressing "very intensively and efficiently," but also that they represent "a certain potential threat." Mr. plenipotentiary, how do you view this matter?

[Ostrowski] I confirm the minister's position that the evacuation of these troops is taking place efficiently and on schedule. As known, the withdrawal of the combat units is to be completed by 15 November 1992. At present 12,000 soldiers of the Northern Group of Troops are still in our country.

[Wagrowska] Could there exist discrepancies between the Polish estimates and the actual situation, as had happened when the Russians evacuated people by air and did not allow this to be supervised, so that no exact statistics could be established?

[Ostrowski] Anything of the kind would be minimal, because we exchange exact information fairly often. But still some discrepancies might arise because, it being my long-standing argument, no one in Poland has ever been privy to the exact numbers of these troops.

[Wagrowska] Does this mean that you doubt whether that total ever exceeded the number of 65,000 fixed by the 1956 agreement?

[Ostrowski] Rather not; at most, it was close to that number.

To return to the principal issue, let me add that in addition some 20,000 family members and civilian employees of these troops also are living in our country. On the other hand there is not left a single tank or plane or combat helicopter, nor a single piece of ordnance (cannon or mortar) exceeding 100 mm in diameter, or of antiaircraft artillery. At most there is a handful of armored transporters. Cohesive combat units above regiment strength do not exist even in the heretofore largest garrisons. Besides, Swietoszow has already been taken over by the Silesian Military District [the Polish military] and Borne-Sulinowo is under the protection of the Pomeranian District.

But do the remaining troops pose a threat? Considering that it is no longer are armed with combat equipment, aside from personal side arms which for the most part are warehoused, the Russian army is not a full-scale combat unit. On the other hand, we can infer that inasmuch as the Russians still operate airfields adapted to the takeoffs and landings of the most modern aircraft, combat equipment can always be supplied by air. Moreover, the depots and warehouses still contain stocks of artillery and firing ammunition, explosives, etc. Thus a threat does exist, and that is why I agree

with Mr. Onyszkiewicz, and anyway I would appreciate it if you would not force me in my capacity as a general to disagree with my minister.

[Wagrowska] Your comments seem to imply that cooperation with the current Commander of the Northern Group of Troops General Leonid Kovalyev is better than it used to be in the past with General Dubynin.

[Ostrowski] That is a risky statement, because Gen. Kovalyev has been here only since recently, yet this 49-year-old staff officer, a graduate of the Suvorov Military Academy, has already made himself known as every inch a soldier.

[Wagrowska] In the sense of being a Russian nationalist?

[Ostrowski] At any rate, when he comes to negotiate with us, he clearly lacks patience, because to him all that counts is obeying orders. All the same, he is not making the kinds of bellicose declarations that his predecessor, Gen. Dubynin, used to make.

[Wagrowska] Now that Gen. Dubynin has become chief of the Russian General Staff, does he show any special interest in the issue of withdrawing his troops from Poland?

[Ostrowski] As far as I know, he is authorized by President Yeltsyn to oversee troop withdrawals from various countries, and in view of his having commanded troops in Poland in the past, he is particularly interested in this issue, or so it seems to me. This seems to be demonstrated by his recent interview in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, reported in your newspaper, in which he declared that Russians will dismantle and take away property regardless of whether it is installed in permanent facilities like airfields and fuel bases, although under the Moscow agreements that property should be transferred to us in usable condition. In such—and other—matters, let us lay our cards on the table.

[Wagrowska] These complicated questions are now to be resolved by you, in accordance with the decision of the Council of Ministers.

[Ostrowski] Yes, the supervision and coordination of trade in movable property are among my new domains of activity. As known, under the Moscow agreements of 22 May 1992, the zero option was adopted, meaning that nobody will pay anybody anything. We are not demanding of the Russians compensation for ecological damage, or repair of leased facilities, but neither will we pay for the leftover facilities built by the efforts and resources of the Soviet army. But so far we have not succeeded in defining the meaning of usable property. Gen. Kovalyev at first seemed to agree that it means a complete, undamaged and defect-free normally operating facility, to be transferred to the Polish side only after these criteria are met. But the facts show otherwise.

[Wagrowska] Examples, please.

[Ostrowski] Early in July I was swamped with faxes from the Legnica Voivode complaining that the Krzywa and Legnica airfields continue to be razed, with slabs of concrete and sections of cable being ripped out. This was disturbing, and so I asked the commander of the Northern Group of Troops to make an on-site inspection together with me in order to dispel suspicions. He did not reply. Several days ago I

received a similar faxed complaint from the Gorzow Voivode: I inspected inventoried facilities of the former Soviet army in our voivodship and found that they are being dismantled, with fuel tanks being excavated and sold contrary to the mandatory customs and tax regulations. When on 29 July a meeting was finally held between myself and Gen. Kovalyev, he voiced his astonishment but would not agree to a joint inspection. He merely declared that he was going to check this out on his own. Well then, who is obstructing the matters here? In such a situation I have no grounds for doubting the voivode, but likewise I have no grounds for doubting Kovalyev.

[Wagrowska] And there exist more such instances, do not they?

[Ostrowski] Consider the fax from the Wroclaw Voivode stating that a representative of the KECz (billeting service) has declared that, before housing in Olawa is to be transferred to the Polish authorities, the kitchen ranges, boilers, bathtubs, and plumbing fixtures will be dismantled and removed. Such instances could be multiplied.

[Wagrowska] Would you say that there is a method to this procedure?

[Ostrowski] I am justified in thinking so, and besides we are dealing with disorganization and deficient discipline within the Northern Group of Troops.

[Wagrowska] Has the withdrawal of Russian troops from Poland or their transit from Germany across our territory been accompanied by any major incidents in addition to the affair of the missing cesium?

[Ostrowski] So far, no. Knock on wood.

[Wagrowska] For a long time the Polish side has been raising the issue of compensation for ecological damage.

[Ostrowski] In this case also the zero option applies, but every time a facility is transferred to us its ecological condition is recorded. In this case the Russians are not very obstructive, although they do not always allow Polish environmental protection inspectors access to the area of the facilities they are about to abandon. Yet this is highly important to us, because troop evacuation entails a higher-than-normal danger of some contamination. But the new commander [Gen. Yakovlyev] consents to the inspections only on condition of prior notification.

[Wagrowska] Might not this mean a desire to conceal not only ecological damage but also residues of radioactive, chemical, or toxic materials?

[Ostrowski] The available facts do not allow such an interpretation, but the assumptions verge at probability. The best example is precisely the affair of the missing cesium. A long time before that cesium disappeared we had received, upon asking the same question you are asking now, a reply to the effect that, let me quote, "Radioactive materials in isotope form are used solely for diagnostic purposes at the military hospital in Legnica. Nowhere else on Polish territory are

radioactive materials used by the Northern Group of Troops." And then the cesium affairs surfaced to loud publicity.

[Wagrowska] Are there any other demands, in addition to those discussed above, that the Polish side is making on the Russian?

[Ostrowski] It is important to us to perform customs inspections at the three airfields for transport aircraft, that is, in Kluczewo, Legnica, and Swinoujscie. In addition, the Russians would like to keep for themselves until 1993 two airfields (Kluczewo and Legnica), whereas we see no need to leave for foreign use combat airfields for the needs of 6,000 troops and transit.

I would very much like for us and the Russians to part in a civilized manner and for myself and my Russian counterpart to maintain honesty and integrity in our mutual relations, and for words uttered and written in Polish-Russian relations to be honored. But please consider that the local townspeople and municipal authorities in the places inhabited by Russian troops see and know more than I do from my Warsaw office. Never again there should be situations in which we hand each other bouquets of flowers against a background of devastation.

#### **Fear of Poland's Becoming New Drug Market Noted**

92P20373A Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish  
4 Aug 92 p 2

[Article by Ireneusz Dudziec and Krzysztof Wielgopolan: "Will the Colombians Enter Poland?"]

[Text]

"The Colombian drug cartel may soon begin operating in Poland," states the Polish INTERPOL official dealing with the fight against the drug dealers.

The Colombian drug cartel from Cali is interested in East Europe. The American government agency DEA [Drug Enforcement Administration] warns that Poland may soon change from a transit point for drugs to a large scale market for drug sales. In the not so distant future, the Colombians may also invest in the Polish chemical industry in order to acquire the ingredients needed in narcotics production.

Last Saturday, the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Police of Czechoslovakia completed the running of a course for advanced members of antinarcotics units from East Europe. The course took place in Prague. The only Pole who completed the course is part of the national unit of INTERPOL, from the Main Police Command (due to the nature of his work, he asked that his name not be disclosed). He discussed the two week course with GAZETA.

"The DEA agents told us [police from the former USSR, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Germany participated in the course—the editors] that the United States has ceased to be a developing market for drug dealers," said the officer from INTERPOL. Europe has

become the main goal of the drug dealers, where last year, a 1,004-percent increase in drugs confiscated was noted, mainly cocaine and heroin.

#### **Colombians in Europe**

According to the DEA, the illegal narcotics trade was curtailed thanks to the introduction of regulations restricting the sale of chemical substances used in narcotics production. The DEA index contains 33 substances, including the run-of-the-mill chemical acetone, which is used in virtually all narcotic production (coca leaves are immersed in it). The DEA registers and controls all the chemical firms in the United States. As of 1 January 1993, similar laws will be binding in West Europe. This is why the Americans are warning about an invasion of Colombian capital into the chemical industries of East Europe (such cases have already occurred in Czechoslovakia).

"We were shown films from hidden cameras in which the main characters from the Cali cartel appear," said the Polish officer. "They, of course, give the impression of being upstanding businessmen. For example, the primary adviser to the chief of the cartel is a graduate of Harvard," he added.

#### **Seconds Count**

The DEA agents also showed on videocassettes flawless operations in which drug laboratories were destroyed. Due to the threat of explosion of high pressure equipment used in metaamphetamine production (an easy modification of amphetamine, primarily inhaled), the entire action has to be executed in a few seconds.

#### **The Stars Can Help**

An important training sight for the agents was at the airports and seaports. "Due to the secret nature of the service, I cannot discuss this," said the officer from INTERPOL. The Americans recommended that drug addiction be fought by trying to reduce the demand. They suggested that the mass media be used in advertising the harmful effects of drugs, and use famous actors and sportsmen in such commercials. They claim that this has had results in the United States. It seems that a campaign titled "How To Fight Stress," aimed specifically at children and youth, had a similar effect on lowering narcotic use.

#### **A Sad Statistic**

According to information passed on to the Polish police by the DEA, last year there were over 14,000 crimes recorded connected to drug addiction (among which was narcotics trade and smuggling and also crimes caused under the influence of narcotics, for example robberies and break-ins into pharmacies, robberies and murders).

Due to overdoses, 190 people died (in 1990, 90 people).

In 1991, 724 severe poisonings occurred (in 1990, 690).

The production of narcotics solely for sales purposes and not for personal use is on the rise.

In 1991, 150 kg of cocaine was confiscated in Poland and over 10 kg of heroin. The confiscation of the so-called kompot [homemade narcotic] was not even registered.

Poland still has not ratified the basic act of international law in the fight against narcotics—the Vienna Convention of 1988.

**Districts, Minorities in Electoral Law Discussed***92EP0569A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish  
8 Jul 92 p 2*

[Article by E.O.: "Electoral Districts as Voivodships in the New Electoral Law"]

[Text] The Tuesday meeting of the Extraordinary Commission for Electoral Law Affairs was devoted, almost in its entirety, to considering the size and boundaries of electoral districts.

The authors of the draft electoral law proposed that the smallest electoral district should correspond to the smallest voivodship. This would give the smallest district three mandates. Meanwhile, the largest electoral district should not be larger than 10-12 mandates. This solution would necessitate dividing several voivodships into smaller districts.

Deputy Wojciech Arkuszewski presented another proposal. He favored maintaining the division into district established for last year's election, since, in his opinion, the electoral law should not be drawn up to meet the needs of a single election. A new territorial distribution is being prepared. According to this distribution, the districts set up in the electoral law, which will coincide with the territory of the voivodship, may be completely different than they are at present.

A recent vote established that electoral districts will coincide with the territories of voivodships. The Warsaw and Katowice Voivodships will be exceptions to this. In both cases, the distribution which is favored is the same one as was in effect during the last elections—into Warsaw and the voivodship and into three districts in Katowice.

At the Tuesday meeting, the commission decided that representatives of the national minorities competing for a parliamentary seat will not have to obtain the support of a minimum of five percent of society in order to obtain a mandate (this threshold binds all other candidates). The deputies also plan to consider additional preferences for national minorities, granting these social groups the rights to vote in a single, selected electoral district. The problem lies in the fact that except for the German minority, national minorities' social groups are scattered throughout the whole of Poland. Thus, even if the obligatory threshold is lifted, these groups are not in a position to obtain enough support to win mandates (previous parliamentary elections have demonstrated this).

The members of the commission also discussed who should have the right to vote for candidates for parliament. In accordance with the constitution, organizational units authorized to nominate candidates in parliamentary elections are: political parties, social organizations, trade unions and groups of electors. Thus, adding in any other groups requires changing the constitution. This may be implemented with the approval of two-thirds of the deputies participating in a plenary debate. Despite this difficulty, almost all of the commission members were of the opinion that this point of the electoral law should be changed. Some people were in favor of political parties having the exclusive

right to announce candidates, especially since there are no obstacles to registering a party. Another proposal seeks to make an exception to the preceding principle for national minorities which do not wish to create party structures. Moreover, there is no need to force them to do this. However, many deputies have opted for registered social organizations and trade unions to have the right to present their own candidates in elections. No vote was taken on this issue due to the lack of a quorum.

At its coming meetings, the commission has yet to consider a proposal for the partial refunding of the election campaign for parties which obtain mandates (there has been preliminary discussion of this matter), coverage of parties in the mass media, and the issue of extending the ban on election campaigning to churches and chapels.

**Trade With Eastern Nations Increases Sharply***92EP0581A Warsaw RYNNKI ZAGRANICZNE in Polish  
No 80, 4 Jul 92 p 2*

[Article by T.E.R.: "Poland Regains Eastern Markets"]

[Text] According to information obtained at the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation, our exports to postsocialist countries (namely, the former USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Albania, the former Yugoslavia, and China [as published]) have been rising at a very good pace in the first five months of this year. Income from sales reached \$550 million and was 20 percent higher than in a like period last year. The growth in shipment has been unprecedented since the conversion to trade based on convertible currencies with these partners (that is, since 1 January 1991).

The favorable growth of exports is reflected in trade with all the postsocialist countries with the exception of the former Yugoslavia and China. The biggest increase in exports was to Hungary—by 50.6 percent. For Czechoslovakia this increase reached 36.2 percent, and for the former USSR, 33.4 percent.

Our purchases in the abovementioned countries totaled \$570 million, and thus trade was nearly balanced. This is largely due to the improved balancing of trade with the former Soviet Union, resulting from a stronger linkage of Polish exports to the imports of natural gas and the implementation of shipments under the Jambur Agreement. No cash payments were involved. This is also related to the decline in imports of Russian crude petroleum owing to the diversification of the sources of this raw material by Polish importers.

The process of restructuring trade with out postsocialist partners is continuing. Most noteworthy in this connection is the decline in the share of machinery and equipment in both exports and imports.

A growing role in trade is played, on the other hand, by chemicals and consumer goods. In exports to the former USSR agricultural goods and foodstuffs account for a rapidly rising proportion.

On the postsocialist markets our private traders are acting with increasing boldness. It is estimated that the private

sector by now accounts for 20 percent of that trade, compared with 17 percent in 1991.

According to preliminary estimates, trade with the European postsocialist countries and China will for this year as a whole be close to last year's level and amount to \$4.5-5.0 billion.

### Discussion of Employee-Driven Privatization

92EP0576B Warsaw ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE  
in Polish No 28, 12 Jul 92 p 7

[Article by Waleria Mikołajczyk: "From the Privatization Viewpoint"]

[Text] Magdalena Gwiazda and Włodzimierz Pankow from the "Solidarity" Union Studies Center of Mazowsze Region recently made a study (based on a sample of 39 enterprises privatized via the capital method and 58 privatized via liquidation and transformed into employee companies) aimed at recording the course and effects of privatization with special emphasis on employee-driven privatization. What did this study show?

Mostly large enterprises, with over 500 employees, are being transformed through the capital method, and mostly small enterprises, with fewer than 500 employees are being transformed through liquidation, although approximately 15 percent of the employee-owned companies surveyed were formed from enterprises employing more than 500 and even more than 2,000 people.

The initiators of transformation in 75 percent of the enterprises that went the capital method and 50 percent of those formed through liquidation, were their managements. Also, in none of the enterprises was any kind of trace of the notorious "Bermuda Triangle," which would stand in the way of privatization, noticed. On the contrary, the employee representatives, and particularly the workers councils, demonstrated a great deal of initiative in this area, especially when it came to transforming an enterprise into an employee-owned company. However, the complete absence of such outside partners as domestic or foreign banks, and insurance firms, whose participation theoretically should have been expected, in the transformation process was ascertained. What was even more striking was that the "big absentee," insofar as transformation initiative is concerned, turned out to be the Ministry of Privatization and the parent agencies.

Simply absent? The question suggests itself if one considers that, as the study showed, capital privatization (from the time the application for transformation, together with documentation, to the time it is crossed out of the register of state enterprises) in 80 percent of the cases does not take longer than one to six months, while liquidation privatization in almost 40 percent of the cases takes seven to 12 months, and in 20 percent of the cases, even more than a year. It may be assumed that difficulties in pricing the assets, determining legal status, etc., play a part in prolonging the procedure. But if one considers that large, often multiplant economic units take the capital road, and mostly

the small and uncomplicated enterprises take the liquidation road, it is hard to say that these difficulties are objective.

In any case, as the study showed, enterprises using the liquidation method encountered five times as many obstacles than enterprises using the capital method, had four times as much difficulty in pricing the estates and determining its ownership status, and twice as often faced bureaucratic problems in the form of rigid adherence to regulations and incompetent officials. And if one also considers the extremely unfavorable terms for leasing the assets of liquidated enterprises and the barriers to access to foreign capital encountered by employee companies, only admiration can be expressed at the workforces' determination, thanks to which the largest number of privatizations were accomplished precisely through transformation into employee-owned companies.

It is interesting to know how enterprises behaved after they were privatized.

The study showed that adaptation measures were undertaken much more often by firms transformed via capital than via liquidation. The difference in frequency of organizational changes is particularly vivid. They were made twice as often by firms transformed via capital than via liquidation (demonstrating, in any case, complete similarity to traditional state firms which the Union Studies Center studied somewhat earlier).

This can be explained first by the fact that in small firms the possibilities and needs for organizational changes are much smaller than in large firms, and second by the fact that the employee companies that were studied existed in this form for a much shorter period of time than the firms privatized through capital. Thus they had much less time in which to make organizational changes. But both groups of transformed enterprises equally rarely undertook such actions as changing management methods or the wage system, or attempting to reduce prime costs, not differing from this standpoint from state enterprises.

It is striking that firms transformed through the capital method more than three times more often than those transformed through liquidation described their economic condition as bad. They also stated more frequently that things became worse after privatization was completed. It is very enlightening that the firms that applied most of the adaptation measures rate their economic situations the lowest. And most of the changes "for the better" occurred in the enterprises that applied such measures the least often. This seems to say that the condition of enterprises in our country depends not so much on their economic activeness as it does on the external conditions of their operation.

The study shows that in firms privatized by the aforementioned methods, i.e., capital and liquidation, a monocentric structure of authority is formed. Decisionmaking is concentrated at the top, except that in employee companies it is spread equally between the boards and the supervisory councils; however, in the firms privatized by the capital method, the entire authority is concentrated in the hands of the board. Centralization of decisions also takes place. On

the other hand, the influence of the employees and their representatives weakens. In every second firm (regardless of the privatization method) the influence of the workforce shrunk, but in every fifth employee company this influence grew. The authors of the study express doubts that these changes, which are contrary to an industrial democracy, characteristic of enterprises in Germany and Japan, the two countries with the most dynamic economies, will promote the growth of efficiency in our firms. In employee companies, the presence of trade unions alone has fallen by half and where there are none, no thought is being given to forming them. This can be explained by the fact that in owning company stock and participating in profits in the form of bonuses and prizes, employees feel less need to articulate their interests.

But although the authority in the firm becomes monocentric, an autocratic, but consultative, style of management is shaped. In the overwhelming majority of the firms privatized by the aforementioned methods, the boss or owner, before making a decision, asks the employees for their opinion. Except that in firms privatized by the capital method, it takes the opinion of the employees into consideration less often on social issues, such as wage matters or working conditions. However, in employee companies the opinion of the employees is more important in matters of the firm's substantive activities, such as work organization, production methods, servicing, marketing, and advertising.

But almost equally seldom is the opinion of the employees requested relative to the firm's strategy in enterprises transformed by both methods. Although in employee companies the opinion of the work force is taken into account in the division of profits, in enterprises privatized through capital this happens very seldom.

Higher earnings compensate workers for their loss of influence. This is very evident especially if we compare them with the earnings in state enterprises and in the budgetary sphere. In slightly under 12 percent of the employee companies and almost 20 percent of the enterprises privatized by the capital method, average earnings were less than two million zloty [Z] a month, while in 20 percent of both types of firms average earnings exceeded Z3 million. The rest of the firms fell in between. Compared with state plants and budgetary institutions, it can be said that these are decent earnings.

It should be mentioned that in the enterprises studied, conflicts were relatively rare and strikes marginal, despite that in firms privatized by both methods group dismissals had occurred. It may be that the employees who remained in the privatized firms are happy with their situation. Much less happy are those who were dismissed. It is not surprising, therefore, that employees in enterprises that have not yet been privatized look upon privatization with ever greater distrust and aversion.

### Crisis in Farm-Machine Industry Discussed

92EP0553A Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement)* in Polish 17-18 Jun 92 p III

[Article by Edmund Szot: "A Cry for Succor in the Farm-Machinery Industry"]

[Text] During 1990-91, sales of farm machinery plummeted to nearly one-fourth (27 percent) of their 1989 level. In probably no other industry has a decline in output been as drastic. In this case it was due to two factors: the increases in machinery prices due to the increases in the prices of materials and energy, and the decline in the purchasing power of farmers, whose incomes dropped to about 60 percent of the incomes of the nonfarm population.

Given such a huge decrease in their incomes, farmers ceased to focus on investing in means of production, thus placing some of the industries serving them in a veritable dramatic situation. For while producers of mineral fertilizers can somehow save themselves by exporting their products, the farm machinery industry has practically no opportunities for survival (eventual purchasers of Polish farm equipment, that is, the countries of the former USSR, lack the funds).

A collapse of this industry would incur irreparable losses. Purchasing foreign farm machinery would require spending about \$1 billion annually, and to an overwhelming majority of farmers that machinery would be unreachable. The farm machines manufactured by Western countries are on the average three, and sometimes 10 times as expensive as their Polish-manufactured counterparts. Preserving the domestic farm machinery industry is also favored by the considerable potential of Polish agriculture and the fact that the number of potential buyers of such machinery in Poland is larger than in any other European country.

These assumptions underlie the measures taken by the Ministry of Industry and Trade, which commissioned the Industrial Institute for Farm Machinery in Poznan (PIMR) to prepare a sector study of the farm machinery industry. In addition to that institute, the following took part in preparing the study: the PROMASZ Office for Economic Studies and Consultancy in Warsaw, Agromet-Project Poznan, the Institute for the Construction, Mechanization, and Electrification of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry. The study covered 18 largest enterprises of the farm machinery industry accounting for 75 percent of all Polish-produced machinery used in crop cultivation. The economic situation of all these enterprises is difficult; they all are in debt, and at them all production cost is higher than sales income. Hence, all these factories are money losers.

The principal finding of the study prepared by the above-mentioned institutions is as follows: no restructuring measure taken at these factories will any longer assure their profitability. Given the current output level, it is no longer possible to produce at a profit. There remains just one possibility: stimulating the demand. This objective can be accomplished through the state's intervention on the crop

**Key:**

1. Output level and prices of farm machinery
2. Prices
3. Production
4. *Source: PISiPAR* [expansion unknown]

market, but this would conflict with the principles of the market economy (and besides the state lacks the funds for this purpose). It also is possible (there being no other alternative, properly speaking) to grant farmers preferential credits bearing the same interest rate as that applying to credits for the purchases of mineral fertilizers and pesticides.

Engineer Jan Gromadzki of the PIMR estimates that granting preferential credits to farmers for the purchases of farm machinery would take about five trillion zlotys [Z], compared with about Z700 billion in subsidies from the budget (given an interest rate of 28 percent). For comparison, purchases of farm machinery at the abovementioned 18 factories totaled Z1.390 trillion last year. Altogether, spending by farmers on purchases of farm equipment last year was about Z2 trillion. Unless steps are taken to stimulate demand, sales of farm equipment this year will be still lower.

The PIMR's proposal assumes that the farmer purchasing new equipment would pay 30 percent of its price, with credits accounting for the remainder. The authors of this concept for stimulating demand claim that at least half the funds thus spent by the state budget would return to it

inasmuch as then farm laborers about to be discharged would remain hired, and thus the state's tax receipts would increase and, moreover, then the state would not have to spend funds on unemployment benefits and the revenues of the state budget from sales taxes paid by energy producers and retailers would increase as well. Furthermore, owing to the resultant increase in demand, the debt of the farm machinery factories would cease growing and, thanks to other measures, such as universal debt relief, elimination of 50 percent of payment arrears, and elimination of wage-increase taxes and tax on assets, the farm machinery industry could be placed on a regularly profitable basis.

The aforementioned 18 factories employ about 13,000 persons. Although farm machinery sales decreased by 73 percent, employment at these factories dropped by only 20 percent. The wages are low, but everyone keeps expecting that some day an upturn in the business cycle is bound to occur. After all, the capacity of the Polish farm machinery industry is not excessively large, and only with respect to a few products (e.g., grain and green-fodder dryers) it exceeds the domestic needs. For the most part, it fits the needs. More even, the variety of equipment manufactured by this industry is too limited. At the same time, its collapse would be utterly disastrous.

**Shipments of Principal Crop-Cultivating Machines**

Machine	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Trailers	19,900	14,700	7,600	6,400	2,100
Cultivating units	—	—	2,700	1,800	300
Manure spreaders	34,600	30,600	23,000	12,000	5,600
Lime spreaders	21,700	21,100	44,300	14,400	4,200
Tractor-drawn grain seeders	19,300	20,800	14,600	8,600	4,600
Potato planters	11,000	13,200	8,400	11,700	12,700

Shipments of Principal Crop-Cultivating Machines (Continued)

Machine	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Tractor-drawn sprayers	—	13,100	11,600	6,400	4,000
Rotary mowers	12,300	9,900	17,700	24,300	13,800
Grain combine harvesters	5,000	5,300	5,800	4,600	800
Potato harvesters	3,700	5,200	6,000	8,600	2,700
Beet harvesters	1,100	1,300	1,700	1,900	200
Pickup trailers	4,200	5,300	5,600	4,100	1,600

**Establishment of Rural Debt-Reduction Fund**

92EP0561B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 2 Jul 92 p II

[Article by Edmund Szot: "The Fund Is at the Fence"]

[Text] Minister Gabriel Janowski kept his word and on 1 July began the activity of the long-awaited Fund for Agricultural Restructuring and Debt Reduction. He was appointed, let us recall, by an order of the Council of Ministers dated 11 June 1992, and his goal is to create a system of credits for agriculture that will make possible the initiation of long-term restructuring in this sector of the economy.

The basic task of the Fund for Agricultural Restructuring and Debt Reduction will be to fund the extension of credits for the modernization of agricultural management, the development of services for agriculture, and the development and modernization of food processing. In financing credits for agriculture, the state will at the same time be pursuing a definite policy, bestowing financial rewards on selected types of food production only.

An additional task of the fund, the most urgent at this point, will be to help to reduce the debt of those agricultural enterprises that undertook the work of modernization earlier and which for that reason fell into the so-called debt trap. Debt reduction should not be understood simply as the Fund repaying the debts incurred. Aid from the Fund will make it possible to lengthen the repayment period of just one debt (to, at most, seven years), during which a forbearance period (of one year at most) is possible.

In this financial institution's first day of operations (such an institution is something new in Polish agriculture), a session of the Fund Council took place. The Council is composed of representatives of all three trade unions that are active in agriculture as well as representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Food Economy, the Ministry of Finance, and the National Bank of Poland. The Fund Council, the composition of which is determined by the agriculture minister, has among its tasks the specification of the banks' margins of profit, the approval of budgetary tax estimates, the determination of what sort of entities (in the sense, for example, of forms of ownership) may take advantage of the help of the Fund, etc. The first session of the Council may be considered informal, as nominations were not yet turned in to its members. Nonetheless, the representative of the Agricultural Trade Union "Self-Defense" has

already resigned from the Council, prompted by his union's dissent as to the form and mechanism of the Fund.

The budgetary estimate of income and expenditure presented to the members of the Council indicates that 3.252 trillion zlotys [Z] will flow into its accounts this year, of which about Z2.8 trillion can be effectively utilized. (A portion of the resources will flow into the fund's accounts only at the end of the year.) Of this amount, it is proposed that Z800 billion be allocated for purchasing farm debts, Z600 billion for sureties and credit guarantees, and the rest (in other words Z1.4 trillion zlotys) for modernization credits at a fixed minimum interest rate corresponding to the current rate of 24 percent, with a 25 percent supplement from the fund's resources.

The Council's members were also informed of the conditions that a farmer must fulfill when he applies to refinance his debt with the fund's resources. Only those farmers who applied the credits to agricultural production or to investment related to food processing and the rendering of services have the right to such aid. Another condition is that an appropriate application must be submitted to the fund. It should contain documentation of how the credit was used and an improvement program. The improvement program contains an introductory section, which includes the legal status of the farm or enterprise, the number of people employed, other sources of income, and a description of fixed assets and personal property. Moreover, a description of the debt (the amounts; their elements, types, and structures; and creditors) should be submitted. Finally, the opening balance of the improvement plan is presented. In a key part of the application, a description of the improvement plan is given, in which the amount of credits needed is given, along with annual (projected) balances, statements of income, financial plans for operations and a quarterly cash-flow plan during the first year, a proposed period of debt repayment, stages of repayment, and the necessary forbearance period. The farmer taking on credit should also indicate in his application that he is obligated to observe the provisions of the improvement plan, to sign an agreement giving the conditions of debt repayment contained in a promissory note, to give information to the Fund upon demand, to immediately return the value of the Fund's aid in the event he does not perform the duties he has assumed.

In the opinion of Ministry of Agriculture Director General Jerzy Rej, farmers with a higher education, or even a high school education, possess sufficient knowledge to work out

such an improvement plan independently. Those who do not feel able to draft it may take advantage of the aid of specialists from the agricultural extension centers or any other person or firm. The most important thing is that such a plan prove reliable. Tests of the fund's principles of operation indicate that these very improvement plans may turn out to be a bottleneck in utilizing these resources.

### **Performance of Savings Bank Reviewed**

92EP0561C Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA  
(ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish  
26 Jun 92 p III

[Article by P.J.: "How We Save at the PKO"]

[Text] The General Savings Bank of the State Bank [PKO BP] is, in terms of its balance sheet, the largest bank in Poland. Likewise, the second largest bank in terms of sums, PeKaO S.A. [Polish Security Bank Joint-Stock Company], specializes in handling the savings of the public. On the understanding that inasmuch as PeKaO S.A. is a power in regard to the amount of hard-currency deposits obtained, PKO BP is the largest in regard to the value of deposits accepted in zlotys.

Interest on deposits in PKO is, in relation to other banks, relatively unattractive. This is mainly the result of the need to make loans for housing construction, which is not too profitable. However, thanks to its very well-developed network of offices, PKO collects the savings of many people, particularly small-scale, frugal persons. At the end of last year, the average sum in a time deposit at PKO amounted to 1.75 million zlotys [Z].

Last year was not too successful for PKO. In fact, although the amount deposited in savings accounts grew continually, that was in large measure an effect of accumulating interest, not the new deposits of the public. Especially bad was the second half of last year, when the balance of deposits was negative and amounted to Z3.27 trillion. The most money (Z1.55 trillion) was withdrawn in October of last year. Later the balance of deposits gradually grew, so that in February of this year it reached a level of Z467 billion. However, in March, once again, more money was withdrawn than deposited.

In sum, during the first four months of this year, Z982.8 billion were deposited. This comprised just 10.4 percent of the value of deposits made in the same period last year.

It is worth considering why the balance of deposits in PKO is now positive, now negative. The last drop in deposits, in March, is easily explained by the rise in the dollar's exchange rate. The sudden abandonment of deposits in zlotys as a form of savings probably caused it.

One can speculate that last year's abrupt change in the exchange rate of the dollar and the change in the method of establishing its rate had a similar effect. October's mass withdrawal of deposits (Z1.55 trillion was withdrawn at that time) to a certain extent explains the reduction in the public's total zloty reserves. These factors are independent of PKO. However, the very policies of the bank also had a great influence on the value of deposits made. This is seen when we consider what percentage of funds deposited by the public in banks finds its way to PKO. In the first quarter of last year, 35.6 percent of the increase in deposits found its way to PKO, in the second quarter 30.7 percent, and in the third just 16.2 percent. Nevertheless, in the fourth quarter this indicator rose 31.1 percent. The growth of interest in savings in this period in PKO can be tied to the rise in the interest on deposits in November of last year.

In sum, in the course of last year, the value of deposits in PKO grew by 119.6 percent, but this took place mainly in the first half of the year (92.4 percent). In the first four months of this year, the value of deposits grew by just 19 percent, in other words, less than the rate of inflation in this period (20.4 percent). At the same time, the total value of zlotys deposited in the banks grew by 29 percent. If interest were to be considered separately and not included in the accounts of clients, it would turn out that the growth in the value of deposits in PKO at that time was even lower (14.1 percent).

From January to April of last year, the sums that grew the most were those invested in Lokata bonds (which grew by 88 percent) and those put into short-term (three-month or six-month) time deposits (which grew by 31.1 percent and 34.8 percent respectively). However, the value of moneys deposited for longer periods diminished. Moneys deposited in hard-currency accounts are growing slowly too. Last year, they grew by 55.9 percent, this year by 9.4 percent. Annual accounts are most common among hard-currency deposits, but the greatest growth in value this year was noted in three-month and six-month accounts.

**Stolojan on Country's Prospects, Own Plans**

92BA1324A Bucarest LIBERTATEA in Romanian  
5-6 Aug 92 pp 1-2

[Interview with Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan by Octavian Andronic; place and date not given: "The Faith of the People Is a Heavy Burden"]

[Text] [Andronic] It has been more than nine months since you took over as head of the government. What, in your opinion, have been the high points in your job?

[Stolojan] The change of government, which is a new practice in Romania, and specifically the negotiations with the political parties may lead to big difficulties in the formation of the new government. The matter of forming a new government must be very well prepared by the political parties: They must choose their alliances well in advance, because otherwise the negotiations will be very difficult; that was the major obstacle we had to pass. Another point, to take it in chronological order, was of course the struggle to overcome the problems of the past winter, which were exacerbated by the actual lack of energy reserves. At the same time, we had to overcome difficulties while still rescuing the economic reform, not by returning to an economic dictatorship, which is what we tried and almost succeeded in doing. Another difficult point was of course the delay in foreign financing that occurred in February-March of this year and that practically made it impossible for us to attain a balanced rate of exchange and thus to use the market economy mechanism in allocating foreign currency. Consequently, we are only now achieving that, and the cost to the Romanian economy and society, the cost of this issue that must be clarified, is that there will once again be a price change.

[Andronic] On 1 September?

[Stolojan] No, before that, in connection with the problem of subsidies, we must align domestic prices to the new balance rate operating in the economy. I am referring to the price of coal and energy, which undoubtedly will reflect on many other prices in the economy. But if we do not do it, there will be complete disarray in the economy and administration. Tensions will be created that will explode in the first month of the new government. So this is the price that Romania is paying for what occurred in February and March. It was actually the delayed financing of the foreign currency balance. That is what it was. Now we have the proper foreign financing, is it feasible, and we can rely on it. Of course, there were difficult moments in the negotiations with the trade unions, too. A sui generis understanding.... Mutual concessions that allowed us to go ahead with the reform and the balances, with restoring the balances. You see, I keep talking about restoring balances, but I don't know whether people realize what this means, all the economic balances reflected in demand and supply relationships, and others as well. Our former society was in a state of balance, but it was based on the past political and economic dictatorship. But we must restore a state of economic balance based on new mechanisms, on the mechanisms of economic freedom.

[Andronic] The mechanism of economic structure?

[Stolojan] Precisely! This year is a decisive year, because it has been the fate of this government to have as its main objective the struggle for economic stability, relegating to second place what was referred to as an economic upsurge. I think that if we manage to stabilize the economy this year—and we are not far from that—next year interest rates may indeed come down and a certain economic upsurge may be achieved. Because in reality there are both positive and negative signs. That is it. It is a difficult job for the trade unions, too. As you see, this government also does not have clear political support, even if it is supported by the FSN [National Salvation Front], a party that is at the same time engaged in the electoral campaign and that does not always agree with the decisions of this government, because at times the political reasoning is different from the viewpoint of a government that works like we do. I cannot avoid recognizing this fact, the fact that now we are obligated to align the prices to the new exchange rate and that such alignments will always take place in the future, but on a smaller scale. We will run into additional difficulties in these 60 days we have left. Consider this manufactured shortage of sugar, because it was manufactured. I had firm governmental contracts for importing sugar, and it is my impression that private firms simply did all they could to sabotage these contracts so as to be able to import privately and sell at the highest possible prices.

[Andronic] Was this an isolated, coincidental phenomenon, or...?

[Stolojan] The phenomenon was generated by the existence of two sugar markets. An additional lesson, if you wish. The idea—not a bad one in itself—was that by having this sugar we took it upon ourselves to ensure certain quantities for the consumers, which means that we were importing sugar at subsidized prices. But then we let other importers bring in sugar, which was to be sold at market prices. This practice exists in other countries, too, so a parallel market to the official market is not something illegal. Unfortunately, however, in view of the situation prevailing in our country, it seems that those who want to sell sugar on the parallel market at market prices have begun to sabotage the government's endeavors to bring in sugar to be sold at subsidized prices. Naturally, we cannot continue to be passive about it and now we have taken measures to protect the government supply from the greed, so to speak, of some enterprises. Unfortunately there has been an entirely undesirable delay. You see, this is another signal. What signal? That when it comes to the economy you cannot sit in two boats at once (as the Romanian saying goes) too long. It is not possible. One must decide. Of course, what stopped the liberalization was the plant, which had a very large production deficit, because not enough sugar beet was sown. But the tendency we want to follow is liberalization. If we come to an agreement with the trade unions, by 1 September sugar will be somewhat more expensive, we will offer a compensation, but the problem will have disappeared.

[Andronic] More than once you used the term management to refer to the government at this time. Was that a mere professional quirk, or an adjustment to the specific work required by a society in deep economic crisis?

[Stolojan] The trouble is that in Romanian the word management has a very limited sense. People usually associate it with taking inventory of the management of a storeroom. Management is a much broader word. In a market economy, management also means managing a plant, that is, actual leadership, the activity of steering the plant, and the responsibility.

[Andronic] Staying in the realm of these terms, do you believe that when you took over you should have received a management report from your predecessor, and that you should do the same when you pass on the office?

[Stolojan] This is what happens. As a rule, governments come and go within the organized framework of democracy. Reports are natural in this kind of framework—what was achieved of the objectives of the government party and the respective government. This is something natural in a democracy. How did this government come to power? I am sorry to have to say it, but the truth is that it came to power by a street coup. So what management report can be made to a government that was installed by a street coup? To whom should it explain what it took over and what it did not? People forget this aspect. Normally, governments that will be democratically replaced in our country will have to receive and pass on the management to succeeding governments. In fact, there are balance sheets for the periods in which certain political parties that are voted into power must show the electorate what they achieved. That was one aspect. What was the second aspect? It was a personal thing regarding me, meaning that I did not need to manage with everything that was here. I knew almost in great detail, from the inside, even though by April I had stopped working. Nevertheless, I knew exactly where we stood and I set on with all my energy to resolve the one problem that, with each passing day, could become extraordinarily difficult to solve. I, for example, will make a report. I will clearly show at what point we are in the reform, or in the economy, and what the problems are. I already sent several reports to Parliament, in which I always dealt with major points. As for the accusations against the previous government, people forget very quickly. They forgot the situation that prevailed in 1990 and the first part of 1991, they forgot that we were a country accustomed to work by orders and authorization, and at that time it seemed (and this is what people don't want to admit) that what we had was more of the same. The continuity is in us, in people, and in physical structures, but in the political mechanisms this continuity was abruptly and brutally broken. At that time—in the first year, for example—Roman had to authorize many things, because that was the only way to get things done here; Parliament could not pass one law after the other, and here there were issues that had to be resolved from one day to the next.

[Andronic] How are you doing in the atmosphere of suspicion generated by the recent reversals?

[Stolojan] This split between the FSN and the FDSN [Democratic Front of National Salvation] has an acute impact on the political arena. You see, what is very interesting is that this struggle among various political parties, which has now become natural in our country, is a decisive battle for political power, but one in which the combatants

believe that it is natural to use all the conventional and unconventional, permissible and unpermissible means to win.

[Andronic] Speaking of this matter, according to some very firm opinions, you were the only candidate who at this time could be a serious opponent to Mr. Iliescu. Have you not been tempted by the idea to enter the presidential campaign, have not others tried to entice you with such proposals?

[Stolojan] There have been. I had discussions with leaders of political parties. I explained why I was not running in this electoral campaign. OK, leaving aside some presidential candidates whom I do not wish to name and who, as one of them was saying, do not mean to win and are only in the race for the publicity, to become a household name in Romania. No, we will overcome this kind of approaches and in coming years I suspect that no one will think like that anymore. Nevertheless, I believe that the contest between the candidates will be genuine because, you see, both the Democratic Convention candidate and the FSN candidate have the support of political parties with followers among the population, so it cannot be that a commensurate contest will not result from this support.

[Andronic] In a recent statement you left a conditional option open for remaining in politics. To what were you referring?

[Stolojan] At this point I do not feel capable of joining a political party; this is also a matter of prerevolutionary mentality. This does not mean that in a few years, after working in that international financial institution and after my return, I may not also choose a party. I will join a political party because, and this may seem strange to you, I believe in the destiny of political parties. I am convinced of their role, but I do not now feel able to get involved in political parties, because I think that some time is needed for clarification. Anyone needs time for that.

[Andronic] You are in the paradoxical situation of having to take unpopular measures at this time, while your own popularity has begun to grow at the same time. A recent poll stated that at the time it was taken you were the only political personality whose index was on the rise, while everyone else's was falling. How do you feel about this type of view, which was also reflected in the fact that you were awarded several prizes, something equally unusual for a person in such a situation?

[Stolojan] It was one of the, let us say, few moments when I could indeed say that the torture I endured in the past year was worth it, because from the outside the issues may appear very simple and various situations very easy to overcome. I know the effort I had to make to live through the past year. It was one of the few opportunities I had to ascertain that the people, or many of them, do understand that what we are doing here is something necessary and that without it we have practically only one path—toward something worse. By doing these things we can hope for better; if we do not do them, we can be certain of only one thing: that it will be worse and worse.

[Andronic] A sort of awareness of the necessary evil?

[Stolojan] Yes. I tried to explain these things. People could see the difference. I tried to explain at these press conferences, which sometimes were too long. People have faith in you and it is immoral to con them. The most difficult thing for me is to realize that people's faith in me runs against the fact that I am aware that some things need to be done and that, if I put them off, it will be even worse in the future. The faith of the people is a very heavy burden.

[Andronic] Are you optimistic about the future? How long do you think it will be before we see signs of some recovery, and in what conditions?

[Stolojan] I think it will be as of the next year, which, paradoxically again, will be after we are out of office. But I think that as of next year the signs of recovery will become much more evident. If we manage to achieve economic stability, it will become possible to lower interest rates, to stop these price shocks, and after a period of greater stability the struggle between trade unions and employers will also abate in intensity. So by perhaps winning the battle for stability, pay raises will of course no longer come in the form of 20 percent or...but will be 4-5 percent. You see, already several trade union centrals are waving about the idea of 24,000 lei. Of course, if it is 24,000 lei I can make the economy operate at the level of 24,000 lei. That is not the problem, the problem is to stabilize the economy so that one no longer needs raises every year. In fact, there are evident achievements in the area of stability, too; once again I want to remind you that in 1990 salaries were paid to people who did not even work; in 1991 salaries increased 61 percent above and beyond any indexation, while this year the increase was kept somewhere around 20 percent, not counting indexation. Next year, a 5-to-6-percent raise will be normal, and in the following years this struggle for economic stability must continue. Of course, this also assumes as much social protection as the society can afford. If this issue is kept in mind, then the path to economic recovery is opened.

[Andronic] Would you like to take this opportunity to say a few words to the readership of LIBERTATEA, who support and appreciate you? When did you first see and read LIBERTATEA and in what conditions?

[Stolojan] I picked up the first copy in the afternoon of 22 December. Being at the Treasury, we were very close to that area. That first newspaper was a true phenomenon. Coming back to the present, I think that LIBERTATEA is a daily that has found its niche in the mass media, a respectable daily that manages to preserve a secure balance. As far as I can see, the information reported by LIBERTATEA is genuine, of a good quality, and very realistic. And the title box on the first page, which serves to arouse or suggest what such titles can suggest, is also very original and interesting. And I am also pleased because I realize that it is also a financially sound newspaper. Or at least it does not have special problems. I wish it a long life.

#### **Poll on Leaders, Political, Economic Issues** 92P20383A

[Editorial Report] Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER in Romanian on 7 August on pages 4 and 5 publishes the

results of a public opinion poll conducted at the beginning of August by students of Bucharest University. Some 1,819 persons were polled, both in Bucharest and in the provinces (the majority from urban areas). The respondents were asked nine questions:

1. "How satisfied are you with the current political situation in Romania?" The general responses were:

- Very satisfied: 0.82 percent
- Quite satisfied: 7.92 percent
- Not too satisfied: 36.12 percent
- Not at all satisfied: 52.51 percent
- Do not know/No response: 2.53 percent

According to TINERETUL LIBER, the responses were grouped on the basis of age, sex, occupation, and level of education. The most dissatisfied age group consisted of adults (54.90 percent); men were more dissatisfied than women (56.58 percent compared to 48.64 percent); workers in the production sector were more dissatisfied than those in the services sector (54.61 percent compared to 49.64 percent); college-educated persons were more dissatisfied than those without a high-school education. These figures do not take into consideration those who are not too satisfied! If we add the responses of the latter group to the responses of those who are not at all satisfied, we easily exceed 90 percent! The 0.82 percent who said that they were very satisfied should give us food for thought. What must have been the dialogue between the elected officials and the voters during the past two years? The answer, friends, is blowing in the wind.

2. "Compare your standard of living during the Ceausescu period with your present standard of living." The responses were:

- Much higher: 2.75 percent
- Somewhat higher: 20.84 percent
- About the same: 22.87 percent
- Somewhat lower: 23.03 percent
- Much lower: 29.18 percent
- Do not know/No response: 1.32 percent

TINERETUL LIBER says, "As far as age groups are concerned, the youth were somewhat more satisfied with their present standard of living (1.63 percent 'much higher,' and 26.83 percent 'somewhat higher'); women were more satisfied than men (3.93 percent 'much higher' and 21.66 percent 'somewhat higher,' compared to 1.57 percent 'much higher' and 20.02 percent 'somewhat higher,' for men).

"Persons in the services sector (3.62 percent 'much higher' and 26.27 percent 'somewhat higher') were more satisfied than those in the production sector (2.28 percent 'much higher' and 20.23 percent 'somewhat higher'), and much more satisfied than persons who are unemployed—retirees, homemakers, jobless (2.55 percent 'much higher' and 15.71 percent 'somewhat higher'); persons with higher education were much more satisfied than those without a high-school

education (4.68 percent 'much higher' and 23.15 percent 'somewhat higher,' compared to 2.14 percent and 16.67 percent).

"The largest response to the third choice, 'about the same,' came from women (25.94 percent), senior citizens (26.46 percent), persons in the production sector (23.64 percent), and those with higher education (26.11 percent). The responses 'somewhat lower' and 'much lower' were given by men (24.75 percent 'somewhat lower' and 31.83 percent 'much lower'), senior citizens (23.89 percent and 28.81 percent), the unemployed (22.08 percent and 34.39 percent), and persons without a high-school education (19.29 percent and 36.19 percent). These results, dear readers, speak for themselves."

3. "Are you in favor of using all means to support Bessarabia in the Dniester Region problem?" The responses were:

- Yes: 51.57 percent
- No: 15.56 percent
- Yes, but not militarily: 20.07 percent
- Other 'noes': 0.55 percent
- Do not know/No response: 11.71 percent

TINERETUL LIBER adds: "In this case, dear readers, we will let you judge for yourself."

4. "How do you think your standard of living will change during the coming year?" The responses were:

- Will improve a lot: 5.33 percent
- Will improve somewhat: 27.93 percent
- Will remain unchanged: 23.47 percent
- Will worsen somewhat: 19.68 percent
- Will worsen a lot: 13.08 percent
- Do not know/No response: 10.5 percent

TINERETUL LIBER adds: "Naturally, by age groups, the youth were the most optimistic (5.28 percent think that there will be a great improvement and 31.30 percent think that there will be some improvement); men were more optimistic than women (5.51 percent 'will improve a lot' and 29.47 percent 'will improve somewhat,' compared to 5.15 percent and 26.39 percent for women.)

"For persons in the services sector, the figures were 7.25 percent and 32.25 percent, compared to 3.92 percent and 27.94 percent in the production sector and 5.52 percent and 23.14 percent for the unemployed.

"By educational groups, the most optimistic were those with a college education (7.88 percent and 28.57 percent). The most pessimistic were senior citizens (19.20 percent think that there will be some improvement and 16.39 percent think that there will be a lot of improvement), as well as unemployed persons, including retirees, homemakers, the jobless (18.26 percent and 17.83 percent), and persons without a high-school education (19.29 percent and 16.67 percent).

"It should be noted that not many of the persons questioned were convinced that developments related to their standard of living do not depend so much on them as on political changes for which they are waiting."

5. "What do you think is the most important problem which Romania is facing?" The responses were:

- Economic problems: 38.37 percent
- Unemployment and poverty: 13.47 percent
- Inflation: 7.04 percent
- Corruption: 9.62 percent
- Political problems: 15.39 percent
- Other responses: 5.22 percent
- Do not know/No response: 10.83 percent

6. "What solutions do you offer?" The responses were:

- Economic changes: 20.67 percent
- Social changes: 11.11 percent
- Political changes: 28.09 percent
- Other responses: 4.45 percent
- Do not know/No response: 35.68 percent

7. "Do you think Bessarabia should be united with Romania?" The responses were:

- Yes, immediately: 55.47 percent
- Yes, in the next five years: 8.08 percent
- Yes, in the next 10-15 years: 11.65 percent
- No, it is not a good idea: 5.5 percent
- No, this is not the time: 2.97 percent
- Other 'noes': 3.08 percent
- Do not know/No response: 13.19 percent

According to TINERETUL LIBER, "Some 75.20 percent of the persons questioned were in favor of the union of Bessarabia with Romania, 11.55 percent were opposed, 13.19 percent could not give an opinion, and 55.47 percent wanted the union to take place as soon as possible.

"As for age groups, adults were the most impatient (58.46 percent), men more than women (60.51 percent compared to 50.59 percent), persons in the production sectors (56.38 percent) more than those in the services sector (54.53 percent) and more than the unemployed (54.78 percent). In regard to education, the greatest support came from those with a college education (60.34 percent), followed by those without a high-school education (55 percent) and those with only a high-school education (53.73 percent). Senior citizens (16.63 percent) and women (16.83 percent) were the most undecided. But certainly not older women, we should say."

8. "What do you think will be the main three political groupings in the future?" The responses were:

- The National Salvation Front: about 70 percent

—The National Peasant Christian Democratic Party: about 45 percent

—The National Liberal Party: 20 percent

TINERETUL LIBER adds: "Five points were given for the first grouping mentioned, four points for the second, and three points for the third. This seems to us to be all the more interesting since the levels of confidence in the gold medal winner and in the bronze medal winner—on the basis of their present leaders—were low. But that is another story."

9. "How much confidence do you have in each one of these political figures?" The general results were as follows:

Corneliu Coposu:

—Much: 25.95 percent

—Some: 13.14 percent

—Not too much: 11.43 percent

—None at all: 35.39 percent

—Do not know/No response: 11.87 percent

Emil Constantinescu:

—Much: 18.91 percent

—Some: 16.00 percent

—Not too much: 7.7 percent

—None at all: 21.22 percent

—Do not know/No response: 35.06 percent

Radu Campeanu:

—Much: 3.79 percent

—Some: 14.84 percent

—Not too much: 17.87 percent

—None at all: 53.05 percent

—Do not know/No response: 10.45 percent

Nicolae Manolescu:

—Much: 13.63 percent

—Some: 22.05 percent

—Not too much: 12.53 percent

—None at all: 26.11 percent

—Do not know/No response: 25.67 percent

Ion Iliescu:

—Much: 8.91 percent

—Some: 13.69 percent

—Not too much: 12.09 percent

—None at all: 57.34 percent

—Do not know/No response: 7.97 percent

Geza Domokos:

—Much: 3.85 percent

—Some: 10.56 percent

—Not too much: 13.91 percent

—None at all: 61.07 percent

—Do not know/No response: 20.56 percent

Petre Roman:

—Much: 7.2 percent

—Some: 10.72 percent

—Not too much: 14.68 percent

—None at all: 57.56 percent

—Do not know/No response: 9.84 percent

Ion Ratiu:

—Much: 23.09 percent

—Some: 23.91 percent

—Not too much: 10.5 percent

—None at all: 33.1 percent

—Do not know/No response: 9.4 percent

Ion Manzatu:

—Much: 4.34 percent

—Some: 13.8 percent

—Not too much: 14.35 percent

—None at all: 44.15 percent

—Do not know/No response: 23.36 percent

Calin Popescu Tariceanu:

—Much: 4.51 percent

—Some: 9.35 percent

—Not too much: 13.03 percent

—None at all: 33.64 percent

—Do not know/No response: 39.47 percent

Victor Surdu:

—Much: 7.31 percent

—Some: 10.72 percent

—Not too much: 11.76 percent

—None at all: 47.22 percent

—Do not know/no response: 22.92 percent

Theodor Stolojan:

—Much: 28.97 percent

—Some: 23.69 percent

—Not too much: 15.72 percent

—None at all: 22.21 percent

—Do not know/No response: 9.4 percent

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